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Abstract 
 
 This thesis analyzes the impact of Europeanization on national sovereignty, through 
a case study examining the French experience between the Maastricht Treaty of the early 
1990s and the Treaty of Lisbon in present day.  It approaches the study of 
Europeanization and French national sovereignty from two directions, addressing both 
political and social sovereignty.  While Europeanization and European integration are 
most identified with the economic realm, examining political and social sovereignty 
allows for the development of an understanding of how Europeanization operates as a 
top-down process.  Europeanization began on the supranational level, bringing the states 
together economically.  It then developed on the interstate level, bringing together leaders 
politically.  Currently, it is expanding to the subnational level, uniting the people of all 
member states socially.  Because of this progression, Europeanization has had the most 
impact on economic sovereignty, less on political sovereignty and the least on social 
sovereignty.  Though Europeanization and national sovereignty are traditionally seen as 
locked in an either/or battle, this study of France’s experience with political and social 
sovereignty throughout the past twenty years suggests that Europeanization is not 
destroying national sovereignty, but rather, allowing for a reinterpretation of national 
sovereignty and the relationship between nation-states and international actors.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
For 300 years a specific notion of sovereignty has existed in the international 
system.  The Peace of Westphalia signed in 1648 gave birth to the nation-state and 
concurrently formally recognized the sovereignty of the ruler of the state.  With the 
creation of the European Union (EU), originally the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), in 1951, this sovereignty was first called into question.  Originally, the ECSC 
consisted of six members: France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg, brought together in an economic union.  However, over time, the size and 
the scope of the organizations have evolved, culminating in the creation of the European 
Union (See Table 1.1).  Today, as an international union, consisting of 27 member states 
spanning Europe and a variety of governing organizations, the EU is redefining the shape 
of the international system and the role of sovereignty.  The institutions of the European 
Union bring member states together in the realms of political, economic, and social 
policy, providing a means for unified action and decision-making on the world stage. 
In order to gain the benefits of membership in the EU, there are costs that member 
states must incur as well.  In many cases, member states relinquish sovereignty to the 
governing bodies of the EU, such as the European Council, the European Parliament and 
the European Commission.  The EU can be a source of great opportunity, but many 
member states perceive it as a challenge as well.  As the EU grows increasingly larger, 
the role that individual member states play in regulating certain areas of economic, social, 
and political policy is decreasing.  With the creation of the single market, national leaders 
lost control over their monetary policy. In the political sphere, member states must now   
 2 
Table 1.1  - Major European Treaties
1
 
                                                
1
 Europa, “Treaties and Laws,” http://europa.eu/abc/treaties/index_en.htm; Karen Smith, European Union 
Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009). 
Name Dates Accomplishments 
Treaty Establishing the 
European Coal and Steel 
Community 
Signed – April 18, 1951 
Effective – July 23, 1952 
Established the basis of 
what would become the EU 
through the creation of a 
common coal and steel 
marketplace 
Treaty of Rome Signed – March 25, 1957 
Effective – January 1, 1958 
Formally established the 
European Economic 
Community (EEC), 
expanded the common 
market 
Merger Treaty Signed – April 8, 1965 
Effective – July 1, 1967 
Established the Council and 
the Commission for the 
European member states 
Single European Act Signed – February 28, 1986 
Effective – July 1, 1987 
Established the conditions 
that would lead to the 
creation of a single market 
Treaty on European 
Union (Maastricht 
Treaty) 
Signed – February 2, 1992 
Effective – November 1, 2003 
Provided for the further 
elaboration of the single 
market, enumerated the 
political and social 
implications of economic 
integration, created the EU 
Treaty of Amsterdam Signed – October 7, 1992 
Effective – May 1, 1999 
Amended the previous 
treaties especially 
Maastricht and built on the 
changes that had been put in 
place by Maastricht 
Treaty of Nice Signed – February 26, 2001 
Effective – February 1, 2003 
Ensure the EU’s 
effectiveness after its 
enlargement to 25 member 
states 
Treaty of Lisbon Signed – December 13, 2007 
 
After the failure of the 
Treaty for a European 
Constitution, provided for 
the further integration of the 
member states through an 
emphasis on the rights of 
citizens 
 3 
come together to make decisions, an increasing number of which are made in Brussels.  
As the EU expands politically and economically, social implications of integration come 
to light as well.  With the creation of European citizenship and the rights afforded to 
those citizens, the boundaries between the member states become permeable, leading to 
increased immigration and posing a threat to national identity in the member states. 
 The impacts of EU membership can be seen in both a positive and negative light.  
The EU gives member states the power to act collectively and more effectively in certain 
areas, but also forces them to accept EU control and authority.  As such, member states 
and the EU alike are reevaluating their relationship to one another and their respective 
roles in the international system.  This reassessment is the basis for the study that will 
unfold over the next six chapters: a study of the impact of Europeanization on national 
sovereignty.  The interaction of these two forces will impact the future of the European 
Union and its relationship with the EU member states and consequently, the international 
system overall. 
 Defined simply, Europeanization refers to the strengthening of structures of 
governance on the European level.
2
  A study of Europeanization examines the increasing 
role of institutions on the European level, as seen through legislation, and suggests that 
over the past twenty years, the strength of the EU has been increasing, making it a more 
effective international actor.  The process of Europeanization has enabled the EU to 
develop from an intergovernmental organization to one that is more supranational.  As an 
                                                
2
 Maria Green Cowles, James Caporaso, and Thomas Risse, “Europeanization and Domestic Change: 
Introduction,” in Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2001), 1.  
 4 
intergovernmental organization, the integration of the EU was originally driven by the 
states as they pursue their national interests.  However, as the EU becomes more 
supranational, the governing bodies of the EU take a more active role, acting in European 
interest above the level of the states.
3
  Necessarily, the increasing effectiveness of such 
structures on the European level impacts the way in which affairs are undertaken on a 
national level.  The power and authority given to these institutions does not appear out of 
thin air; it must come from somewhere…the member states.   
Effective Europeanization requires a redistribution of power between the member 
states and the European Union.  Consequently, the process poses an interesting question: 
what is the impact of Europeanization on domestic regimes?  More specifically, how does 
Europeanization impact national sovereignty?  These questions are both very broad and 
would require extensive studies to formulate an adequate answer.  More manageable, 
however, would be an examination of changes that have occurred within specific member 
states to provide insight into the complex process of Europeanization in the EU as a 
whole.  The conclusions of this micro level study about the process of Europeanization 
and its domestic impact can be expanded and applied to come to a greater understanding 
of Europeanization and its possibilities for the future. 
The experience of all the EU member states cannot possibly be effectively 
analyzed in this study, so it will need to focus on a single state.  Because of the 
peculiarity of France’s attitude toward Europeanization, it will be the focus of this 
project.  The French people, political leaders and the general population alike, have a 
                                                
3
 John McCormick, The European Union: Politics and Policies (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004), 16-
30. 
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very specific conception of the role that the EU should play in the international system 
and how it should be related to the member states.  The French envision a Europe of 
states, which enables interstate cooperation, but still allows states to retain the freedom to 
support or oppose European policies.
4
  The EU should be a corollary to, not a 
replacement for, the nation-state.  This vision of Europe reflects the exceptionalism that 
has long characterized French domestic sovereignty: economic, political, and social.  In 
all three realms, the state has played a critical role through étatisme, Colbertisme and 
l’identité française.
5
  The centrality of the French state is directly threatened by the 
principles of Europeanization.  The process of Europeanization has highlighted the 
inherent conflict between EU membership and the sovereignty of the French state.  
However, despite the conflict, France has continued to take part in the EU, even as its 
role increases at the expense of the nation-state.  Consequently, Europeanization must be 
having an observable impact on sovereignty in France. 
As such, the focus of this research project will be developing an answer to the 
following question: how does Europeanization impact French national sovereignty? As a 
process, Europeanization occurs across three different spheres: economic, political, and 
social.  When Europeanization is successful in sphere, it will lead to closer integration, 
economic, political, or social, depending on the sphere affected.  However, on the 
contrary, when not as successful, Europeanization can lead to an emergence of strongly 
                                                
4
 Ronald Tiersky, France in the New Europe: Changing Yet Steadfast (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Co., 
1994), 3-11. 
5
 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press, 1992), 39-49; Michel R. Gueldry, France and European Integration Toward a Transnational Polity? 
(New York: Praeger, 2001), 15-19, 70-74; Jack Hayward, Fragmented France (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 41-45. 
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nationalistic movements, designed to resist the encroachment of the EU.  The possibilities 
of Europeanization can be great; but when met with resistance, it can be stopped dead in 
its track.  As such, it is important to understand the way in which the process occurs to be 
able to predict its success across the economic, political, and social spheres.   
Within a France, or other member state, is the impact of Europeanization 
consistent across these three different spheres of sovereignty or is the extent to which 
sovereignty is upheld or conceded dependent on the sphere concerned?  The short answer 
is: the impact of Europeanization is not consistent and is in fact highly dependent of the 
sphere of sovereignty that is being studied.  This difference across spheres is due in large 
part to the construction and development of the EU.  When it was founded in 1952, the 
European Union, then the ECSC was first and foremost economic.
6
  It is only logical that 
member states are most willing to transfer economic sovereignty because the leaders and 
population alike have had the most time to come to terms with what the transfer of 
economic sovereignty means and what its implications are for them.  Today, France and 
other states, have relinquished a significant amount of economic control, with much of 
monetary policy controlled on the European level.  Though the French are not necessarily 
the most vocal proponents of economic integration, they realize that there are many 
benefits that come along with, and outweigh, the sacrifices. 
The political institutions of the EU were created after economic integration began 
in an effort to regulate economic cooperation between the member states and enable 
further integration.  Until the 1990s however, the political institutions did not take on a 
                                                
6
 Europa, “History of the European Union,” Gateway to the European Union, http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-
history/index_en.htm.  
 7 
significant role beyond the economic realm.  However, with the Maastricht Treaty, the 
political reach of the EU was strengthened.
7
  The political integration proposed by 
Maastricht and subsequent treaties was not a shock to the member states, then, but was 
something unfamiliar, that had always taken a back seat to economic integration.  With 
the increased economic cooperation proposed by the Single European Act, France and the 
other member states realized it was necessary to provide for further political regulation of 
the economic realm by increasing the strength and the effectiveness of the European 
Union’s institutions.  However, political integration did not go unchecked, as each 
successive treaty continued to make reference to the nation-states and place restrictions 
on the EU. 
As economic and political integration increase, Europeanization extends into the 
newest realm: social integration.  Before the 1990s, the EU was really a distant body for 
many of the citizens of the EU, as they were not directly affected by it.  Economic and 
political integration had a more significant impact on the state and its relationship with 
other states and the EU than on the lives of average citizens.  However, with the 
proposition of increased economic and political union, there was a direct spillover into 
the social realm.  Social integration, in a way, is meant to compensate for some of the less 
popular aspects of economic and political integration.  As the relationship between the 
citizens, the member states and the EU are shuffled, the extension of social rights on the 
European level can assure citizens that their interests will be protected, even as the 
member state loses a degree of control.  Increased economic integration, through the 
                                                
7
 Ibid.  
 8 
creation of a single currency, meant that the European Union would soon become an 
entity that the citizens of member states were exposed to everyday.  When combined with 
the increased visibility of the EU through ratification debates and political participation, 
the EU was no longer something that citizens could escape or ignore.
8
 
Thus, the process of Europeanization has had a spillover effect.  Europeanization 
began in the economic realm and extended into the political realm, where it was 
strengthened and developed.  From the economic and political realms, it is now spreading 
into the social realm.  Thus, the degree of integration is not consistent across all three 
realms of sovereignty.  The impact that Europeanization has (or has not) had is not just 
dependent on the strength of the institutions and legislations on the European level, but is 
also highly correlated with the conception that member states have of their national 
sovereignty and the degree to which they are willing to relinquish some of that 
sovereignty in favor of pursuing the larger goals of the EU. 
National sovereignty refers to the authority that nation-states have over their 
economic, political, and social policies.
9
  Often, political leaders and the general 
population equate national sovereignty with the autonomy and independence of their 
state.  Common political, social, and economic conceptions bring members of a nation-
state together, defining an “us” (the nation) against the “them” that exists outside of 
national boundaries.  The nation shares a political and economic system as well as a 
national identity.  In France, these notions are all wrapped up together in the 
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 Ibid. 
9
 Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 3-10. 
 9 
understanding of national sovereignty.
 10
 
National sovereignty plays a particularly important role within the European 
Union.  In order for states to obtain the economic, political, and social benefits of 
membership in the EU, they have to give up some of their sovereignty (in one or more 
realms, depending on the policies enacted).  If states are giving up a degree of their 
unique sovereignty in favor of that which comes from the EU, then the line between “us” 
and “them” becomes blurred.  Thus, the process of Europeanization becomes extremely 
complicated.  Not only must there be a strengthening of institutions of governance within 
the EU, but the member states must also be willing to relinquish some of their 
sovereignty as well.  Because of the strong correlation between national sovereignty, 
independence and autonomy, the proposed impact of Europeanization on national 
sovereignty is often met with reluctance and opposition. 
In France, particularly, national sovereignty is especially valued and guarded, by 
both political elites and the general population.  French national sovereignty is often 
synonymous with the notion of French exceptionalism; the French state, economic 
system, culture and people are unique in the world.  Many peculiarities of the French can 
be explained by merely attributing them to French exceptionalism.  In France, there is a 
very specific conception of national sovereignty that links the nation-state, the nation and 
the state.  The state plays a central role in all spheres: economic, political and social.  
Consequently, French national identity, though based in French culture, also incorporates 
                                                
10
 Martin Marcussen et al., “Constructing Europe? The evolution of French, British and German nation 
state identities,” Journal of European Public Policy 6, no. 4 (Special Issue 1999): 619-622; Brubaker, 21-
49. 
 10 
political and economic elements as well.  Because of the all-encompassing conception of 
national identity and national sovereignty, a threat in one realm (economic, political, or 
social), has vast implications that threaten the overall understanding of what it means to 
be French.
11
  
As a result of French exceptionalism, the French have been very wary of 
Europeanization and the impact that it will have on their identity and sovereignty.  
However, this is not to say that the French are completely opposed to the possibility of 
Europeanization.  Rather, in some ways, it’s quite the opposite.  Table 1.2 illustrates the 
opinion of the EU that has been held by French presidents throughout much of its history. 
There is not a consistent trend of pro-European attitudes or Euroskepticism.  However, 
over time, French politicians, though remaining skeptical, have become increasingly open 
to the idea of a more powerful EU.  This dichotomous approach to Europeanization can 
be attributed once again to the peculiarities of French exceptionalism.  The French have a 
very specific understanding of the shape that the EU should take in the future.  They want 
to see a Europe of states, wherein the individual member states retain their sovereignty 
and can decide whether or not they want to cooperate with the policies of the EU.
12
  If the 
French believe that Europeanization is moving them in that direction, then they are more 
than willing to support Europeanization and the legislation that enables it.  However, if 
the future envisioned by the leaders of the EU does not match with the ideal picture held 
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 Brubaker, 43-49; Tiersky, 14-19. 
12
 European Parliament, “MEP debated forthcoming crucial Lisbon summit and new Reform Treaty,” 
October 2007, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+IM-
PRESS+20071008BRI11349+ITEM-002-EN+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN; Commission of the 
European Communities, Eurobarometer Flash: Quelle Europe? Les Français et la construction 
européenne, May 2009. 
 11 
by the French, then the French become very reluctant to accept Europeanization.  The 
French, then, can be either a great proponent for or opponent of Europeanization. As one 
of the states with the most specific conception of its identity and the role of the European 
Union, studying its reaction to Europeanization provides important insights into the 
possibilities for integration in the future. 
Table 1.2 – French Presidents and Europe
13
 
Name Date European Attitude EU Milestone while in 
Office 
Charles de Gaulle 1959-1969 Gaullist: Euroskeptic, 
wanted to assure France’s 
interests were upheld   
Empty Chair Crisis 
Georges Pompidou 1969-1974 More open to the EU than 
de Gaulle, but still 
cautious 
Great Britain, Denmark 
and Ireland become the 
first states to join the 
founding members 
Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing 
1974-1981 Giscardist: pro-European, 
supported integration and 
enlargement 
First direct election of 
the European 
Parliament 
François Mitterrand 1981-1995 Supported a confederal 
view of Europe, wanted 
integration rather than 
enlargement  
Single European Act, 
The Treaty on 
European Union 
Jacques Chirac 1995- 2007 Tried to balance Gaullist 
tradition with the benefits 
of openness to the EU 
Treaty of Amsterdam, 
Treaty of Nice, failed 
EU Constitution 
Nicolas Sarkozy 2007 - 
present 
Supports an EU aligned 
with the French vision, 
has become more pro-
European through his 
involvement with the EU 
Treaty of Lisbon 
 
                                                
13
 Alain Guyomarch, Howard Machine and Ella Ritchie, France in the European Union (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1998), 24-29, 84- 87; Nicolas Sarkozy, “Speech to the European Parliament,” Strasbourg, 
December 2008, http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/President-Sarkozy-s-speech-to,14165.html; Nicolas 
Sarkozy, “Speech after the passing of the bill authorizing the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty,” Paris, 
February 2008, http://ambafrance-in.org/france_inde/spip.php?article4282; Europa, “History of the 
European Union. 
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The study that unfolds throughout the next six chapters will concentrate heavily 
on how the French have reacted to Europeanization in two realms: social and political.  
Though economic integration is important, its formative years took place largely before 
the 1990s, when this study begins.  Both the political and social realms are areas in which 
integration has been a relatively recent notion.  Despite the challenges that 
Europeanization faces in France, the French have not been vehemently opposed to either 
the social or political implications of European integration.  So long as Europeanization 
progresses slowly and cautiously, with respect to the more critical elements of national 
sovereignty, the member states of the EU can become more closely integrated.   
  Understanding the motivation behind the French reaction to changes in these 
spheres will provide insight into the possibility of further integration due to 
Europeanization in the future.  If France, though reluctant, transfers political sovereignty, 
for example, then there is a high probability that other member states that are less jealous 
of political sovereignty will transfer their sovereignty as well.  A transfer of political 
sovereignty throughout the European Union would suggest that in the future, it might be 
able to effectively replace the nation-state politically.  However, if France is not willing 
to transfer social sovereignty, for example, then it is unlikely that the European Union 
could ever replace the nation-state socially.  Though at present there are 27 member 
states that make up the European Union, integration can only go as far as the most 
reluctant member state is willing to let it go.  France, with its extremely particular view of 
the future of the EU, is often one of the most reluctant states and is vocal about its 
opposition.  Thus, observations about France’s reaction to Europeanization can provide 
 13 
important insights into the future of the EU and its ability to be an effective international 
actor.   Based on these observations, conclusions can be drawn about the ability of the 
European Union and the process of Europeanization to lead to political, economic, and 
social changes within the member states.   
Despite the reservations of France and other member states, the leaders of the 
European Union continue to encourage further integration through Europeanization.  
Europeanization has been particularly active in the political and social realms over the 
past twenty years, the time period around which this study centers.   Both political and 
social integration were reinvigorated by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and further 
strengthened by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007.  Studying the impact of these two treaties, 
both on the European level and the domestic level, provides important insights into how 
the process of Europeanization evolves over time.  The political and social spheres will 
be examined separately, but with a similar approach: utilizing the texts of the Treaties 
alongside elite discourse, public opinion, and relevant secondary sources.  These two 
studies will lend insight into understanding the balance of power between the European 
Union institutions and the member states, as well as shifts that have occurred in that 
balance.  Furthermore, examining political and social sovereignty in France at two time 
periods will enable conclusions to be drawn about the nature of Europeanization as a 
process.  The data gathered from this case study will be the basis for the formulation of a 
theory developed to answer the question driving this study, suggesting how 
Europeanization is impacting the different spheres of sovereignty in France. 
In brief, Europeanization is having an impact across all spheres of national 
 14 
sovereignty.  Economic integration is incredibly strong, which has enabled 
Europeanization to have a moderate impact in the political sphere and a limited, but still 
significant, impact on domestic social policies.  The progression of Europeanization is 
very closely related to perceived impact of integration in that realm, as well as the 
amount of time that the Europeanization has been relevant in that sphere.  As such, 
integration is most developed in the economic realm, with the political realm following 
fairly close behind and the social realm lagging a bit.  However, Europeanization, as 
suggested countless times, is a process.  It does not occur overnight and the extent of 
economic integration that exists today has been the result of more than fifty years of 
cooperation.  These observations suggest that in the future, the European Union may 
potentially replace that state in the political realm, but will never take the place of the 
nation-state or the nation socially. 
The development of this answer can be traced throughout the five chapters that 
follow this chapter, which provide an introduction and overview of Europeanization and 
national sovereignty and an in depth study of the questions that their relationship pose 
about the future of the European Union and the international system.  Chapter 2 allows 
for a deeper understanding of Europeanization, national sovereignty, and French 
exceptionalism.  It also summarizes the historical evolution and current state of research 
as pertains to these three important topics and their interaction.  Chapter 3 details more 
thoroughly the logic behind this research study including the theory that will guide the 
study and the specific methods that will be utilized.  Chapters 4 and 5 are the essence of 
the empirical study of the impact of Europeanization on national sovereignty, specifically 
 15 
French national sovereignty.  The result of the studies undertaken in these two chapters 
will enable the formation of conclusions about the future direction of Europeanization, 
both domestically and internationally.  Chapter 4 focuses on the ways in which the 
domestic political system has been altered as a result of Europeanization, examining two 
important moments in European history: the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon, 
as well as tracing political changes over that twenty year period.  Chapter 5 contains an 
in-depth analysis of the somewhat limited impact of Europeanization on French social 
sovereignty, utilizing the same two moments as the study of political integration.  
Chapters 4 and 5 each provide brief background of the relevant sphere of sovereignty as 
well as an analysis of the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon and corresponding 
public opinion surveys and elite discourse.  This analysis will be corroborated by 
pertinent secondary sources.  Chapter 6 will bring together the findings of the previous 
chapters to explain the answers to the overarching questions posed by a study of 
Europeanization and national sovereignty.  The conclusion will also provide an 
opportunity to address the larger implications that this study has for Europeanization, the 
European Union, and its member states.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
Since its inception in the 1950s, the European Union has taken on several 
different forms, each with unique structures and distribution of power.  The EU has 
grown from six member states to 27.  It has evolved from merely an economic union, to a 
community of states that is politically and socially integrated as well.  Suffice it to say, 
the European Union that exists today is much larger and more powerful than any of its 
founders would probably ever have believed. 
Though the EU has grown tremendously in size, now encompassing nearly 500 
million citizens in almost as many square kilometers, it has also become smaller through 
closer integration.  Integration in the EU, in the economic, political, and social realms, is 
due in large part to the process of Europeanization, defined as “the emergence and 
development on the European level of distinct structures of governance.”
1
  
Europeanization has important implications not only for the European Union as a 
supranational organization, but for the member states as well.  As the structures of 
governance are developed, increasing the power and strength of the EU, the member 
states must relinquish a degree of their sovereignty and control as well.  Thus, the 
construction of the EU consists of carefully balancing national sovereignty and the 
pressures of Europeanization. 
Necessarily, as the European Union grows and develops, the role of the member 
states must change as well with a degree of power being given to the EU.  The domestic 
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regimes in those member states must shift as well to accommodate the new roles and 
responsibilities of the EU.  Thus, the continued growth and expansion of the EU due to 
Europeanization poses an interesting question: what is the impact of Europeanization on 
domestic regimes?  More specifically, how does Europeanization impact national 
sovereignty?  Are all elements of national sovereignty impacted to the same extent or is 
Europeanization more or less effective in certain spheres?  Looking at specific EU 
member states and the changes that have occurred within them can provide insight into 
understanding Europeanization in the EU as a whole. 
France, as one of the founding members of the EU and a state whose sovereignty 
has long been the object of study by many international political scholars, is also one 
whose behavior can lend insights into the process of Europeanization.  French 
sovereignty has been associated with exceptionalism: the idea that there is something 
innately different about the French; their political, economic, and social systems exist 
nowhere else in the world and cannot be replicated.  However, scholars such as Andrew 
Jack and Ronald Tiersky are questioning whether this tradition of French exceptionalism 
still holds true in the international system today.
2
  This questioning of French 
exceptionalism, at one point in time, would have never taken place.  Its occurrence today 
speaks volumes about the impact that Europeanization has had on France and its 
perception by its people and the international community.  While France was once 
considered the paradigm of the powerful EU nation-state, today that is no longer the case.  
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France’s dominance in the EU is diminishing and with it, dialogue about the role of the 
EU in France and other member states is increasing. 
There is a growing realization that changes in French exceptionalism are 
occurring, lending support to the idea that Europeanization is having a profound impact 
on national sovereignty within the member states of the EU.  It is not enough, however, 
to say that Europeanization is having an impact. Rather, it is necessary to explore which 
areas of French sovereignty are being impacted: political, economic, and/or social, in 
order to understand the implications of Europeanization for the EU has a whole.  A 
wholehearted transfer of sovereignty would suggest the power of the EU as a future 
international actor, whereas a reluctance to transfer sovereignty suggests that it might 
always take a back seat to the nation state.  
 
Sovereignty 
In order to understand the critical role that sovereignty plays in the European 
Union as well as how it is related to the idea of French exceptionalism, it is necessary to 
briefly examine how sovereignty is understood in the international system.  One of the 
challenges that is most often presented by a study of sovereignty is confusion over 
terminology.  Different scholars will refer to the same term but will mean different 
things.  Stephen Krasner’s book, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, has been a critical 
work for clarifying some of this confusion.  Within this work, four types of sovereignty 
are identified: international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic 
 20 
sovereignty, and interdependence sovereignty.
3
   
 His definitions of the four types of sovereignty, which cannot be sufficiently 
reworded without losing the essence of their meanings are as follows: 
International legal sovereignty refers to the practices associated with mutual 
recognition, usually between territorial entities that have formal juridical 
independence.  Westphalian sovereignty refers to political organization based on 
the exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a given territory.  
Domestic sovereignty refers to the formal organization of political authority 
within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercises effective control 
within the borders of their own polity.  Finally, interdependence sovereignty 
referes to the ability of public authorities to regulate the flow of information, 
ideas, goods, people, pollutants or capital across the borders of their state.
4
 
 
 States in the European Union, such as France, while possessing Westphalian 
sovereignty, have also relinquished this sovereignty to a degree by recognizing the 
authority of EU structures, in accordance with international legal sovereignty.  As such, 
the types of sovereignty can coexist, but they can also be exclusionary.  An important 
distinction between the types of sovereignty comes from an understanding of the 
difference between authority and control.  Authority, defined by Krasner is the “mutually 
recognized right for an actor to engage in specific kinds of activities,” whereas control 
often requires the use of force and is more fleeting.
5
  A government may be recognized as 
the authority, while it may not have much control.  Conversely, a regime may have 
control over the people, but may not be recognized as the governing authority.  For the 
purposes of this study, authority will be the focus and therefore, the types of sovereignty 
most closely associated with it: international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty 
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and to a certain extent, domestic sovereignty. 
 The relationship between international legal sovereignty and Westphalian 
sovereignty is closely related to the process of Europeanization.  Krasner writes that 
“international legal sovereignty is the necessary condition for rulers to compromise 
voluntarily aspects of the Westphalian sovereignty.”
6
  This suggests that while states are 
admittedly renouncing certain aspects in favor of the governing structures of the EU, via 
international legal sovereignty, they are still able to retain a degree of authority.  Thus, 
Europeanization can be seen as a process that does necessarily eliminate sovereignty 
entirely, but rather shifts the way that it is conceptualized. 
 French exceptionalism, as traditionally defined, is closely aligned with the idea of 
Westphalian sovereignty.  The intertwining of political, social, and economic elements in 
the development of what it means to be French stems from the crucial role that the French 
state played in the consolidation of the French nation.  The threat posed to Westphalian 
sovereignty by the process of Europeanization, then, does not just threaten the authority 
of the state, but also shakes the notions of what it means to be French.   
 
French Exceptionalism 
  The French state and French exceptionalism, while the outcome of many years of 
state building, are most directly a result of the French Revolution of 1789.
7
  The French 
Revolution impacted four distinct areas in France, contributing to the uniqueness of the 
French state.  First, the French Revolution enabled the creation of a new class within the 
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state, the bourgeois, who were citizens rather than subjects.  The extension of rights to a 
new group was indicative of the rights that all citizens of the state deserved.  The equality 
of citizens was complemented by the second impact of the revolution: the establishment 
of political rights in addition to civil rights.  This began to solidify the new political shape 
of the French nation-state.  The nation-state was also a product of the French revolution, 
as was the idea of nationalism.  Both the French citizen and the foreigner of the French 
nation emerged during this period.  Lastly, a new notion of the state emerged, as the 
ancien régime was abolished and direct membership in the state was encouraged.  The 
French Revolution also established the necessary conditions for the creation of the strong 
central state that has been so closely associated with France today.
8
  The French 
Revolution gave birth to the nation, the nation-state, and nationalism in France.  These 
elements are crucial to the foundation of French sovereignty that has existed for the past 
300 years.  Social and economic sovereignty were bound up in the political identity of the 
state.
9
 
 The political system that emerged out of the French revolution was one of 
étatisme – the strength of the central authority of the state.  The kings of France 
undertook a period of centralization, bringing many aspects of life, especially social and 
economic, under the control of the state.
10
  Though in theory, representative institutions 
existed to check the balance of the state, in practice, they were significantly weaker than 
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the state and did not have much control.  Despite the multitude of government changes, 
from empire to republic and back again, the central political principles of the French state 
held strong and authority continued to be concentrated in the hands of the head of state.  
The form that this head of state took was not continuous, reflecting the instability of 
French political history. The French people were a powerful force that could be 
mobilized for change and were often extended political rights in an effort to quell their 
rebellious nature.  Every time a regime change was desired, the whole government 
system changed as well. In France, there is no concept of peaceful transition.
11
  
Throughout history the changes that have occurred in France have been deliberate and 
dramatic.  
The strong central state extended easily into the economic sphere of French life as 
well. As a result of the centralization of the post-Revolutionary period, the state has 
played a significant role in the French economy.
12
  The economic system that resulted, 
Colbertisme, was marked by state control and policies of protectionism as well as a 
mixture of public and private companies, known as dirigisme.
13
  This state control was 
often needed to combat the mediocrity of the French economy.  Long based heavily in the 
agricultural sector, it did not benefit from industrialization in the same way that many 
other countries did. Consequently, the French have always been protective of their market 
and their economy.  State control has been necessary to encourage the growth and 
success of the French economy.  However, in France there has existed an interesting 
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dynamic between a free labor market and state control of the economy.
14
  This 
contributes to the unique behavior of the French market as well as the role that it has 
played (or failed to play) in the international market. 
 The French Revolution gave rise to a spirit of nationalism and national unity, 
largely as a result of myths perpetuated by the elites in society.
15
  Consequently the 
French nation and the notion of Frenchness were created by the French state.  This 
nationalism was strictly defined, drawing boundaries between the French citizen and the 
foreigner.
16
  During and after the Revolution, the French elites oversaw the development 
of myths and symbols, such as the tricolore (the French national flag), Marseillaise (the 
battle hymn during the Revolution), and liberté, fraternité, égalité (the slogan of the 
Revolution), to encourage a feeling of commonality amongst the French citizens. 
Allegiance to French state was paramount and was encouraged by the state itself.  The 
military and education system were used to foster a spirit of nationalism. The state also 
encouraged a strict policy of assimilation.  Foreigners were encouraged to abandon their 
original identity and assimilate into the French system.  As a result, the French have 
developed a fear of the outsider, seen as a threat to their “Frenchness.”
17
  The role of the 
state in the development of French national identity has caused political and cultural 
aspects of the French state to become deeply intertwined.  Citizenship is not only legal 
but also political and cultural as well.
18
  Any change to one aspect of French identity is 
likely to change how identity as a whole is perceived, threatening not only the notions 
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that have held true for hundreds of years but also the state itself.
19
 
 These three aspects of the French state combine to form what is seen to be French 
exceptionalism, characterized by an emphasis on the sovereignty of the French state.  The 
state has had its hand in almost every aspect of French life, which are all deeply 
intertwined.  A change in one aspect may very well mean a change in others.  Though 
this is not entirely the case today, the sovereignty of the French state is still considered to 
be crucial, pervading all spheres of life for the French citizens and defining much of their 
view of the world.
20
  Politically, the French state remains highly centralized, with a 
socialist government that protects its people.  While loosening economic controls, the 
state is still very concerned with the performance of its economy and is doing everything 
it can to encourage growth and development, despite the restrictions of Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU).  Socially, the French adhere closely to the traditional notions of 
French national identity, wary of changes that might threaten its stability.     
 However, despite this desire to adhere to traditions, France is changing.  France is 
no longer seen as the state to look up to in the EU, the state whose lead should be 
followed.  The French identity and culture that have been so jealously guarded have not 
been able to avoid the threats of globalization and internationalization.  The French 
economy too, has lost some of what made it so unique and protection by the state is no 
longer as feasible as it once was.
21
  With such a strong tradition and history of dominance 
in international affairs, what has led to these changes that have occurred?  The answer is 
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Europeanization.   
 
Europeanization 
 While the impact of these changes can be seen very simply, it is necessary to 
uncover why these changes have occurred.  What has caused the internationalization of 
the very specific national identity found in France?  Why have the French decision-
makers been motivated to change the political structure of France?  Why has France been 
willing to forgo economic protectionism in favor of economic and monetary union 
(EMU) and the Euro?  The answers to these questions are critical for coming to an 
understanding of how Europeanization impacts domestic regimes and what motivates 
nation-states, especially those as jealous of their sovereignty as France, to relinquish 
control to another body.  Current studies of Europeanization look broadly at its impact or 
look specifically at the impact of Europeanization on France, but few use the specific 
study of the exceptionalism in France to draw broader conclusions about the future of the 
EU as a whole.   
 The impact of Europeanization on domestic states has become an increasingly 
popular topic to examine.
22
 Europeanization in general refers to the impact that political, 
economic, and social institutions in the EU are having on the same structures 
domestically.
23
  Europeanization by definition is neither positive nor negative; it is 
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simply a force that leads to change.
24
  In current scholarly work, there is a consensus that 
the process of Europeanization is impacting domestic politics.
25
  Consequently, 
Europeanization has become a hot topic issue in international relations as scholars strive 
to understand how the process works and what the impact will be on the nation-state. 
 Research on the future of the nation-state is nothing new.  So long as the 
European Union has existed, scholars have attempted to understand the way in which 
structures on the EU level interact with those on the domestic level.  Early scholars used 
a bottom-up approach, which attempted understand the European Union from the 
perspective of the states.  Europeanization was seen as a way for states to enact their own 
policies and pursue their interests.
26
  However, with the evolution of the European Union, 
the study of Europeanization and the nation-state has evolved as well, leading to the 
emergence of a top-down theory.  This theory has not replaced the bottom up approach 
entirely, but has become another way to consider the interaction between the EU and the 
nation-state.  The top-down approach to Europeanization holds that because of increased 
power and a transfer of sovereignty from member states to the EU, the EU is now able to 
impact the individual nation-states.
27
  One of the greatest strengths of the EU in its 
current form is its ability to assert “adaptational pressure” on the member states to 
encourage them to change their policies.
28
    
 Increasing knowledge of the EU, as well as more years of data to reference, has 
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enabled scholars to draw up distinctions, such as between top-down and bottom-up 
theories that were not possible before.  Furthermore, a difference can be seen between the 
similar ideas of European integration and Europeanization.  The guide to Eurojargon 
produced by the European Union defines European integration as “the building of unity 
between European countries and peoples…countries pool their resources and take many 
decisions jointly.”
29
  While integration was once the focus of work pertaining to the EU, 
the focus has now shifted to the idea of Europeanization: the emergence of governance 
structures on the EU level.  The notion of Europeanization has evolved as well, to include 
not only the creation of such structures and institutions but also the impact that those 
institutions have on domestic structures.
30
 
 A significant contributing factor in the development of scholarship related to the 
EU has been the evolution of the EU itself.  Originally made up of France, Germany, 
Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, the EU now consists of 27 member 
states, spanning the continent.  An increasing number of member states, in addition to 
almost 60 years in existence, provide many case studies that can be observed to 
understand the ways in which Europeanization works.  Though there is no doubt that 
Europeanization impacts domestic regimes, depending on the structure of the state and its 
history, among other factors, the impact that is felt domestically differs.  Tanja Borzel 
and Thomas Risse highlight three different ways that institutions change domestically, as 
a result of Europeanization: absorption, accommodation, and transformation.  Absorption 
is the most benign, wherein European policies, processes or institutions are internalized, 
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but do not significantly alter their domestic counterparts.  Accommodation can be seen as 
the middle ground of Europeanization, as domestic structures are changed to fit European 
directives, but “without chang[ing] their essential features and the underlying collective 
understandings attached to them.”
31
  Transformation is the other extreme on the scale of 
Europeanization, as domestic policies, processes and institutions are entirely replaced or 
significantly changed.
32
  Whether European policies are absorbed or accommodated by 
domestic policies or transform domestic policies depends largely on the sphere that the 
policy addresses: political, economic or social.   
 Recent scholarship suggests that Europeanization, as a process, does not unfold 
uniformly.  Domestically, Europeanization has impacted different spheres to different 
extents.  In some areas, such as economic policy, the transfer of authority is significant 
whereas as in others, such as social policy, states are more reluctant to relinquish control.  
Depending on the existing domestic policies, some states may not be affected 
significantly by Europeanization.
33
  However, in other states like France, where existing 
domestic policies are based in a strong central state, adopting European policies requires 
a change in domestic policies as well, either by absorption, accommodation, or 
transformation. Theses changes in domestic policies necessitate a change in France’s 
perception of sovereignty as well, because the European Union will now be the 
competent authority where certain issues are addressed.  France is one of the states that is 
most affected by Europeanization, but it is also one that is most reluctant to renounce its 
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sovereignty.   
 France’s perception of the EU and Europeanization has changed many times 
during its period of membership.  Originally seen as an opportunity for France during the 
“golden age,” domestic leaders during the early to mid 1980s saw the EU as a constraint 
on their policies.  In the mid 1980s, the EU was seen as an opportunity once again, but 
this perception was short lived.  In the early 1990s, with the passage of the Treaty on 
European Union (Maastricht Treaty) that gave more control to the EU, France was once 
again fearful of the implications of the EU.  However, currently, scholarship recognizes 
the EU as an opportunity for France to reconstruct its tarnished image.
34
  Throughout the 
past fifty years, Europeanization has divided the French.  The Gaullist/Giscardist 
opposition of the 1970s and 1980s has evolved into the conflict between integrationalists 
and nationalists that dominates debates about the EU presently. 
35
  
Despite a change in terminology, the issues separating the pro-Europeans from the 
Euroskeptics at the core remain the same.  Pro-Europeans recognize the EU as an 
opportunity for France to reassert its dominance in the international system whereas 
Euroskeptics worry about the negative impact that Europeanization might have on French 
identity and sovereignty.  Interestingly, the split between pro-Europeans and Euroskeptics 
does not occur on traditional political party lines, but rather each viewpoint draws 
supporters from both the right and the left.
36
  Necessarily, this bizarre split has an 
interesting impact on the domestic political structure in France, leading to much 
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confusion and uncertainty about France’s role (both real and perceived) in the EU. 
Much of France’s uncertainty as it pertains to the EU and Europeanization stems 
from the fact that France’s ability to control the direction of the EU has been 
diminished.
37
  This shift changed not only how France viewed the EU, but also how 
scholarship addressed the relationship between France and Europeanization.  The 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty is seen as a critical moment in the understanding of 
the France in the European Union. For much of its membership in the European Union, 
until the 1980s, France was often seen as a force directing the EU, in accordance with the 
bottom-up approach to EU studies.  However, with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the 
focus switched, approaching France from the perspective of the European Union.    
While France is still placed at the center of studies pertaining to France and the 
European Union, the way in which the studies are approached differs.  No longer is it 
taboo to question the authority of France or its power to direct the EU.   Rather, scholars 
agree that Europeanization is effectively diminishing French exceptionalism.
38
  However, 
there is also an increasing understanding of how Europeanization can be compatible and 
made to function effectively within the traditional structure of the French state.
39
  Critical 
literature has emerged in the social realm, recognizing the ability of citizens to hold 
multiple identities.  This suggests that French citizens are now required less and less to 
choose between allegiance to their state and the EU, but can be citizens of both France 
and the EU.
40
  Furthermore, it reflects a changing view of the EU by the French and the 
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acknowledgement that Europeanization is not necessarily seen as a positive or negative, 
but rather a very real force that is having an impact on France domestically.
41
  
While changes are occurring throughout France, the most significant cases to 
examine are those of the political and social realms.  A study of the political realm will 
concentrate on the division of decision-making authority and power between the nation-
state and the EU, as well as the degree to which the EU is incorporated into the domestic 
political system.  On the other hand, an examination of the social will be based in the 
more abstract notion of identity, analyzing how citizens of member states relate to and 
perceive the EU as a social entity.  Taken together, the specific studies of important 
issues within the political and social realms can provide important insights into the 
different stages of Europeanization and how it progresses. 
  Within the political realm, the issues of particular interest are competencies and 
cohabitation.  The system of competencies suggests that at the present time, the decision-
makers on the European level understand that a full transfer of sovereignty to the EU is 
not feasible.  There are some areas where the EU exerts control, and there are others 
where nations, regions, or local authorities are given control.
42
  Cohabitation is a similar 
policy on the national level, regulating which of the decision-makers control the 
European policy.
43
 Breaking down barriers between the EU and the member states 
politically (and economically) has had an effect on the way in which the citizens of a 
given state view themselves, as well as how they view the EU.  Europeanization, while 
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impacting each of these realms to a different extent, is, overall, effectively decentralizing 
the French state.  
As a result of Europeanization, the domestic structure of France is changing.  
Now, French policy with regards to the EU is not determined solely by the President, but 
with input from the Prime Minister and other ministers, civil servants and even the 
executives from French companies.  In fact, European policy is officially controlled by 
the Secretariat of the Inter-ministerial Committee rather than the President.
44
  Both 
membership in the EU and further integration redistribute power between the French state 
and the EU.
45
  Though France has traditionally been one of the strongest member states in 
the EU, as a result of Europeanization, it is not only forced to renounce sovereignty to the 
EU, but is also losing the control that it once had over EU institutions.
46
  The internal 
structure of the French political system is changing as well, with the traditional elite 
driven system of politics becoming increasingly obsolete and more reliance on new 
political strategies.
47
  The slight decentralization that has occurred with relation to 
political sovereignty is more profound when examining the changes that are occurring 
economically.  
 As a result of the EMU policies contained in the Maastricht Treaty, the French 
economy has evolved in the past 10-15 years.  The French central bank is independent 
from state control and has been since 1993.
48
  There is an interesting paradox in the 
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French economy, contrasting economic liberalization and privatization with a highly 
regulated labor market and a welfare state.  The government is caught between letting the 
economy be free and continuing to protect its people.
49
 The French government lost the 
use of many of the measures that it used to control its economy, so the economy, 
especially the unemployment rate, is floundering.
50
  It has been proposed that the 
Europeanization of the French economy could help the French state to regain some of its 
lost footing in the EU and would solve some of the economic problems that are 
occurring.
51
   
 Whereas Europeanization can be seen as a positive force economically, socially it 
is seen as a threat to sovereignty and identity.  In the eyes of the French, the expansion of 
the European Union poses much the same threat as the influx of North African 
immigrants, threatening to dilute and transform what it means to be French, while also 
reducing the control that the French government has over its people.  French sovereignty 
in the social sphere has been evolving since the early 1990s when the Maastricht Treaty 
first introduced the idea of European citizenship.
52
  However, despite changes that have 
occurred, the French state still retains sovereignty over the identity of its people.
53
  Social 
changes, especially those pertaining to identity, do not occur quickly, but rather are a 
result of time and “critical junctures” (Marcussen et. al 1999).
54
  This is not to say that 
changes in identity have not occurred, they have.  French citizens see themselves 
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increasingly as French and Europeans, suggesting that changes are in store for the 
singular notion of French identity that has been so pervasive in French politics.  In a 2009 
Eurobarometer poll, 60% of French responded that they see themselves as both French 
and European while in 1992, 47% of French said they never thought of themselves as 
European.
55
  Yet these changes are increasingly observed among the younger generation 
and are by no means indicative of the views of the entire population or the government.  
As this brief overview of France illustrates, Europeanization is having an effect 
domestically.  However, there are opposing viewpoints in the field of international 
relations as to what is the driving force behind the process of Europeanization, 
corresponding to the bottom-up and top-down approaches discussed earlier.  The classic 
debate surrounding Europeanization pitted intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism 
against one another.  However, in recent scholarship, a third theory, institutionalism, has 
come to the fore.   
Intergovernmentalism “contends that member states, or more precisely, the 
executives of the member states, are the key actors in the EU.”
56
  This suggests that 
integration and Europeanization are used by member states as mechanisms to strengthen 
their control and power in the international system.  This approach to Europeanization is 
centered on the work of Andrew Moravcsik, who highlights the importance of national 
interest in driving decision makers and believes that institutions do not have the power to 
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change the actors, rather they are simply mechanisms of reinforcement.
57
  Marcussen 
expands on this idea, explaining that according to “intergovernmentalism…European 
integration should not affect nation state identities, since the European polity consists of 
intergovernmental bodies which do not require much loyalty transfer to the European 
level.”
58
  Thus intergovernmentalism fails to explain such phenomenon as the emergence 
of a European identity. 
 On the other hand, neofunctionalism suggests that European integration (not 
Europeanization) “would gradually lead to the transfer of loyalties to the European level, 
particularly among those elite members involved in the European policy-making 
process.”
59
  This theory still focuses on the role of individual actors at the state level and 
does not acknowledge that institutions can play a significant role in the domestic affairs 
of states.  Neofunctionalism seems to suggest that there are certain thresholds of the 
transfer of loyalties (i.e. after a certain period of time a certain change will be expected).
 
60
  However, this is not the case; as already discussed, the impact of Europeanization is 
not uniform across states, even those who joined the EU at the same time. 
 The failure of both neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism to account for the 
role of institutions in explaining the impact of Europeanization on nation-states led to the 
emergence of a third explanatory theory: institutionalism.  Institutionalism represents the 
top-down approach to Europeanization that has been observed in the recent past.  
Transforming Europe, edited by Maria Green Cowles, James Caporaso, and Thomas 
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Risse is one of the seminal works that takes this approach to the study of 
Europeanization.  This work introduces the idea of Europeanization as a feedback loop, 
wherein it impacts the way in which domestic actors make their decisions which then 
reinforces Europeanization.  This is in contrast to the view posited by neofunctionalists 
and intergovernmentalists who suggest that Europeanization is a one-way process (state 
! EU).
61
  By giving power to the institutions, institutionalism can begin to explain how 
policies are adopted despite not serving the interests of domestic decision-makers.   
 Because in the scheme of European Union scholarship institutionalism is a 
relatively new theory and moreover, one that reflects the current top-down understanding 
of Europeanization, utilizing it for this research study will provide a new perspective on 
the question of the future of the nation-state and sovereignty. An analysis of 
Europeanization based on institutionalism looks at the role that the institutions and 
structures on the European level play in enacting change, rather than looking at the 
impact of the domestic regime in enacting these changes. 
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Chapter 3: Research Design 
  
This research project aims at understanding the way in which the process of 
Europeanization impacts the domestic regimes of member states.  More specifically, what 
impact is Europeanization having on the sovereignty of these states?  Because 
sovereignty is multifaceted, the answer to this question is not simple and consequently, 
requires the exploration of a further question. Is the effect of Europeanization the same 
when examining different areas of sovereignty: political, economic, and/or social?  The 
analysis necessary to understand the process of Europeanization will be based on a 
specific case study: France, examined through the lens of institutionalism.  The analysis 
will then be used to draw conclusions about the way in which the EU structures and 
institutions are defining actions domestically. 
 Institutionalism is the theory that has most recently been applied to the study of 
Europeanization.  Neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism, the two theories that had 
previously been used to understand the process of Europeanization both emphasized the 
member states and political leaders as the main actors in the European Union. However, 
these theories both fail to account for the expanding influence of the European Union as 
an actor and its ability to influence the decisions of individual member states.  The shift 
to institutionalism reflects a new top-down approach to Europeanization whereas both 
neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism only understand Europeanization as a 
process that occurs from the bottom-up.
1
  In the recent past, especially since the 
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Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the European Union has been increasingly capable of 
determining the actions of its member states, reflecting the need to study Europeanization 
in a new light.  Institutionalism is the perfect theory to use in providing a new 
understanding of the process of Europeanization. 
 Institutionalism is actually a broad category that contains seven different 
approaches to the study of the international system: “normative, rational choice, 
historical, empirical, international, sociological and network institutionalism.”
2
  While 
each strain understands the international system and the role of institutions somewhat 
differently, there are common characteristics of all types of institutionalism.  Vivien 
Lowndes highlights six of these commonalities: “a focus on rules…informal conception 
of institutions…dynamic conception of institutions…value-critical stance…disaggregated 
conception of institutions…[and] embeddedness.”
3
  These characteristics can be 
understood according to the following explanation.  Institutions, defined by 
institutionalists, are not organizations, but rather the rules that those organizations 
encompass and the way that they influence the actions of actors.  These rules can be 
either formal or informal and are both dynamic and stable.  Regardless of these 
conditions (formal/informal, dynamic/stable), “institutions embody – and shape – societal 
values, which may themselves be contested and in flux.”
4
  Particularly interesting for this 
study of Europeanization, institutionalists understand that there are many different 
components of institutions that act in different ways and have different impacts on actors.  
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Lastly, by embeddedness, institutionalists suggest that the role of institutions is “not 
independent…existing out of space and time” but rather is dependent on external 
conditions.
5
 
 While all the different strains of institutionalism could likely be applicable to a 
certain extent, for the purposes of this study, the two most relevant approaches are 
normative institutionalism and historical institutionalism.  In addition to the shared 
conditions mentioned previously, normative institutionalism approaches institutions with 
the goal of understanding the ways in which the “norms and values embodied in political 
institutions shape the behavior of individuals.”
6
  Historical institutionalism takes a 
slightly different approach, suggesting that institutions can create a feedback mechanism 
that will influence the way in which future decisions are made.  Combining these two 
versions of institutionalism suggests that the rules and norms created by institutions can 
have a self-reinforcing effect, thus strengthening the institutions.  There will also likely 
be an element of empirical institutionalism, considered to be the classic approach to 
institutionalism, which measures the impact of institutions on governments.
7
 
 As can be seen by this brief explanation of institutionalism, utilizing these 
different approaches as the framework for this research project will provide insight into 
the way in which Europeanization impacts the domestic regimes and national sovereignty 
of member states.  Institutionalism necessitates understanding Europeanization in terms 
of the rules and norms that are established to influence the behavior of states.  It suggests 
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that these rules and norms do not need to be explicitly contained in the EU treaties, such 
as the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty of Lisbon, but that the treaties can be a 
way to formalize the different constraints on the actions of states.  The process of 
Europeanization can be understood as a continuous loop, a positive feedback mechanism.  
As Europeanization influences the decisions of member states, the decisions that are 
made reinforce the strength of the institutions and structures of the EU, which then starts 
the cycle all over again. It can be expected that in areas where Europeanization has been 
successful, the EU will be able to gain further control.  Institutionalism will account for 
the role that the EU and the process of Europeanization play in changing the domestic 
structure of member states as well as changing conceptions of national sovereignty. 
 In this research project, institutionalism will not be used to study the impact of 
Europeanization on all or several of the member states, but rather, will be applied 
specifically to a study of France and the way in which it has been impacted by 
Europeanization.  A specific case study will be useful for gaining a more in depth 
understanding of the process of Europeanization, rather than looking at it generally in 
multiple member states.  By looking at France, it will be possible to observe some of the 
concrete effects of the process of Europeanization, rather than just general trends.  Within 
this single case study, a smaller comparative case study will be undertaken, examining 
political and social sovereignty at two points in time.  Studying each of these areas of 
sovereignty over a period of time will be useful for understanding whether or not 
Europeanization impacts that area and to what extent.  These separate analyses will allow 
for the development of a more thorough understanding of the impact of Europeanization 
 43 
on national sovereignty overall.  Public opinion and elite discourse will be gathered for 
each area of sovereignty at the two points in time, the Treaty of European Union 
(Maastricht Treaty) in 1992 and the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009.  Examining the treaties 
alongside these two data sources will enable an analysis of the broader changes taking 
place on the EU level as well as the degree to which those changes are internalized by 
member states (absorbed, accommodated, or transformed).  
 France is an ideal case to study in an effort to understand the impact of 
Europeanization because of what scholars have termed “French exceptionalism”.  The 
political, economic, and social structure of France, most notably characterized by strong 
state involvement, is unique in the European Union.  It can be argued that this 
exceptionalism negates the utility of France as a case study because findings cannot 
easily be applied to other countries in the EU.  While this may be true, it is precisely the 
unique structure of France and its Euroskepticism that make it a relevant case study.  If 
Europeanization can impact one of the countries that is most opposed to the strengthening 
of the European Union as a central governing body, it is likely that Europeanization can 
also have an impact on other countries that have a more favorable view of the EU.  
 Furthermore, the EU can only be as successful as its most reluctant member-
state.  Nearly every time a new treaty or change is proposed by the European Union, it is 
met with heated debates in France.  Pro-Europeans and Euroskeptics on both sides of the 
political spectrum join together to support their positions.  Pro-Europeans emphasize the 
opportunity afforded to France by its membership in an increasingly integrated EU while 
Euroskeptics hold tightly to notions of French exceptionalism and traditional French 
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identity.  Despite increasing Europeanization, the Euroskeptics continue to hold their 
ground.  Recently, two issues have produced particularly intense debates in France: the 
proposed EU Constitution and discussions over the accession to Turkey.  While 
throughout the 1990s, the pro-Europeans were very successful in enabling soliciting a 
transfer of sovereignty to support further integration, in these two debates, the 
Euroskeptics held their ground and were able to table the EU Constitution and the Turkey 
question, at least temporarily.  The continued prevalence and importance of this division 
suggests that support for Europeanization in France is anything but guaranteed.  
However, it is possible.  Understanding whether or not, and for what reasons, France will 
be willing to support Europeanization and a transfer of sovereignty indicates how 
successful the EU will be at obtaining effective power in the political, economic and/or 
social realms.   
 Drawing a conclusion about the effectiveness of Europeanization in impacting 
different spheres of sovereignty will be possible as a result of the comparative case study 
within the larger study of France as a country in the European Union.  The preliminary 
argument driving this study is that in the French case, Europeanization is impacting 
political policy to a degree and not having much of an impact on social policy.  The goal 
of the comparative case study will be to test whether or not this hypothesis holds true and 
if not, to formulate a new hypothesis that will be effective for generalizing the impact of 
Europeanization of political and social policy in France.  To do this, the political and 
social policies will be examined in the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty of 
Lisbon in conjunction with corresponding public opinion polls and elite discourse on the 
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topics that are addressed.  Because the Treaty of Lisbon amends the Treaty of European 
Union, studying the two in comparison is effective as an example of the way in which 
Europeanization is progressing on the European level.  The changes in specific policy 
areas indicate where Europeanization has been successful in gaining control from the 
member states, and the areas wherein policy has remained relatively the same suggest 
that Europeanization may not be effective.   
However, for this case study, it is not sufficient to merely study the process of 
Europeanization on the EU level.  Primary and secondary sources will be used to 
supplement this study by providing French reactions to policy changes.  Public opinion 
surveys, such as Eurobarometer data, will be useful for understanding how the French 
public perceives the EU, Europeanization, and their own country, as well as the policy 
changes.  Because the elites and decision-makers are the driving forces behind French 
policies, it will be necessary to study their discourse in conjunction with public opinion.  
For both public opinion and elite discourse, using the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty of Lisbon as reference points, it will be possible to observe whether or not changes 
have occurred over time and thus draw conclusions about the impact of the European 
institutions on individuals and the government alike.  Approaching the study of France in 
this way is relevant because it will examine decision-making on the EU level, as well as 
the impact on the domestic level.  By taking into account the viewpoints of both the elites 
and the general population, a broader perspective on the impact of Europeanization can 
be gathered.  
 Undertaking this case study at two different points in time strengthens the 
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arguments that are made and the conclusions that are drawn because the changes can be 
observed firsthand from official documents and primary and secondary sources, rather 
than relying solely on the opinions of other scholars.  However, the works of other 
scholars can be used to corroborate the findings from the analysis of these cases, 
suggesting that the findings are not an anomaly.  Drawing information from multiple 
sources strengthens the arguments that it supports by indicating that there is an observed 
trend.  While relying on public opinion surveys could be problematic because of the 
composition of the pool surveyed, this challenge can be addressed by using surveys 
spanning a period of time that would presumably consist of different pools of 
respondents.   
Wherein the discourse and opinions of political elites are concerned, while having 
data that is more subjective may be a problem in other studies, so far as this research 
project is concerned, opinion is a useful source.  However, it would still be ideal to find 
elites who share the same opinion to illustrate that there is a degree of consensus.  The 
information gathered from both public opinion surveys and elite discourse will be used in 
conjunction with observations made by examining official documents and policy.  By 
diversifying sources and basing preliminary arguments on primary data and official 
documents, there is a decreased change of distortion.  This reliance on sources that are 
factual, rather than analytical, lessens the chances of other scholars’ opinions diluting the 
findings.  However, by using their findings as supporting material, it is possible to show 
that the project and conclusions draw from the case studies are not unique in the scholarly 
world.   
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 Basing the analysis of the official documents, public opinion surveys and elite 
discourse in an institutional framework not only increases the validity of this research 
project, but also increases the likelihood that another scholar could reproduce it.  This 
study does not suggest that institutionalism is the only theory that can be used to study 
the impact of Europeanization on domestic regimes.  Rather, it provides a possible 
approach for understanding Europeanization as a top-down process. Applying the 
principles of institutionalism to the study of Europeanization necessitates the drawing of 
certain conclusions.  As Chapter 2 suggested, there has been consensus among scholars 
that Europeanization has a tangible impact on EU member states, most notably France.  
By briefly examining traditional understandings on French sovereignty in conjunction 
with policies enacted on the European level, changes in the way in which the French 
understand their sovereignty can be identified, such as: the creation of the Secretariat of 
the Inter-ministerial Committee to control European policy, increased European control 
over economic policy, and the gradual willingness of the French to identify themselves as 
both French and European citizens.  These observations are not subjective; rather, they 
are the result of concrete studies of discourse, opinion, and official documents, 
supporting the soundness of this study.  
 Admittedly, however, this project is not perfect, due in large part to the 
constraints of length and time.  One of the main shortcomings is the failure to include a 
study of factors other than Europeanization that might influence changes that occur in 
France.  Due to the constraints placed on this study, it would be impossible to account for 
all the other factors that influence domestic politics.  However, for that reason, this study 
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does not presume to understand why all the changes in France have occurred, but rather, 
how Europeanization has brought about changes in France.  That is, it concentrates on 
examining only the changes that can be considered effects of Europeanization.   
Because Europeanization is an extensive process that has a broad impact, this 
research project also cannot address all areas of sovereignty impacted by 
Europeanization.  In the interest of time and novelty, this study will concentrate solely on 
political and social sovereignty.  Though economic sovereignty is important, the 
integration that emerged from the impact of Europeanization on the economic realm 
began many years before the time period addressed in this study.  Throughout the past 
twenty years, Europeanization has begun in the social realm and taken many great strides 
in the political realm.  Consequently, by focusing on the social and political realms, it is 
possible to see two different stages of integration and understand how the process of 
Europeanization begins to lead to changes.  The impact of Europeanization in the 
economic realm is not to be ignored, however.  Chapter 2 contains a brief overview of the 
historic understanding of French economic sovereignty as well as the changes that have 
taken place since economic integration began.  This overview can be used to compare 
and contrast the developments in the social and political realms, enhancing the 
conclusions that can be drawn about the domestic impact of Europeanization. 
 The approach to the study of Europeanization taken in this project emphasizes the 
impact of the European Union and its institutions on member states, as a top-down 
process, rather than a bottom-up process.  This is due in part to the goals of the study: 
understanding the impact of Europeanization and European institutions on member states 
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and also in part to the fact that many of the studies that have been undertaken utilize 
bottom-up approaches.  Because there are not many studies that currently utilize a top-
down approach, a study such as this one may provide new information that has not 
already been extensively analyzed.  Because the EU member states are each unique 
entities with specific political, economic, and social conditions, the findings that result 
from this study will not be directly applicable to all the other member states.  However, 
because of this shortcoming, the goal of this study will not be to explain the way in which 
other member states will react to the process of Europeanization.  Rather, the conclusions 
that are drawn can be used to provide conditions for understanding why member states 
might be motivated to relinquish one type of sovereignty rather than another.   
Though as a result of EU expansion France has been losing some of its power, it 
is still an important member state to study and the extent to which it is impacted by 
Europeanization has significant implications for the future of the EU. Because France is 
one of the states that is more reluctant to renounce its sovereignty, understanding the 
areas in which French political leaders are willing to transfer sovereignty to the EU can 
provide an indication of the areas in which the EU will be most successful at garnering 
sovereignty from its member states.  Furthermore, if Europeanization and the EU can 
bring about changes in France, which has long been an exceptional case, then it is likely 
that changes can be effected in member states that are less jealous of their sovereignty.  
Because national sovereignty and the nation-state have long been the organizing 
principles for the international system, understanding, however fundamentally, the 
process of their erosion will be very relevant in understanding the shape that the 
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international system will take in the future and the possibility for the success of the 
European Union as an international actor.   
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Chapter 4: The Political Reach of Europeanization 
 
Introduction 
 When the six original members of what is now the European Union, France, 
Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, came together in 1951 to 
form the European Coal and Steel Community, they were concerned only with economic 
integration and overseeing Germany’s redevelopment in the post-World War II era.  Over 
time, the economic union between the member states grew stronger, with the number of 
member states increasing as well to nine, twelve, and eventually, after several more 
enlargements, reaching the current 27 member states.   For the first nearly forty years of 
the European Union’s existence, throughout its various forms, the main bond between the 
ever-increasing number of member states was economic.  However, in the late 1980s as a 
push for greater economic integration occurred, simultaneously, the need for political 
integration became apparent as well. 
 In France in particular, EU politics had never been considered an issue of great 
importance.  The French civil servants (grands corps) and domestic ministries were much 
more concerned with domestic policies than EU ones.
1
  The French decision makers 
tended to see the EU only as a channel through which they could enact their own foreign 
policies goals.  If the goals of the EU did not align with France’s goals, France had little 
interest in the political power of the EU.  Over the past twenty years, from the early 
1990s through 2010, there has been a perceptible shift in France’s approach to the 
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European Union within its domestic politics.  While this change is due in large part to the 
changing goals of the European Union and its member states, its underlying causes are 
more complex than that.  Understanding how, why, and to what degree this shift has 
taken place is the subject of this chapter.  Examining political changes on both the 
European and domestic level, over time, will enable conclusions to be drawn about the 
political aspect of Europeanization.  Equally important, however, is analyzing what 
changes have not occurred.  Despite an increased willingness on the part of French 
political leaders and the public to place trust in EU institutions, there is still skepticism 
surrounding the transfer of sovereignty necessary for the EU to function as an effective 
political actor.  France is caught in a tug-of-war between upholding national sovereignty 
and assuring the success of the EU. 
 This chapter, after giving a brief background of the French political structure, will 
proceed to examine the interaction between Europeanization and the European Union, on 
one hand, and the domestic political impact in France on the other.  The chapter will be 
laid out in three main body sections.   
- Section 2 will examine the Maastricht Treaty and the changes outlined within it, 
as a critical moment in the initiation of political integration.  
-  Section 3 will look at the Post-Maastricht period and the way in which France 
internalized the Maastricht Treaty to understand the ways in which EU legislation 
can have a domestic impact.   
-  Section 4 will fast forward in time to the current era of the failed EU Constitution 
and the successful Lisbon Treaty to examine how Europeanization is progressing 
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and what political factors contribute to its success or failure.   
Each section will contain a mixture of primary and secondary sources and empirical 
evidence, as well as an analysis of the insights provided by that information.  Overall 
conclusions about the relationship between the process of Europeanization and French 
political sovereignty will conclude the chapter. 
 
French Political Structure 
Since the end of the French Revolution in 1789, French political sovereignty has 
been defined largely in terms of an intense degree of centralization.  This political 
tradition, known as étatisme, which literally translated mean “state-ism”, is characterized 
by a concentration of power in the hands of the executive, the President of the French 
Republic.
 2
  More than the power of the executive, however, étatisme emphasizes the 
centrality of the state in all aspects of lives of the French citizens.  The institutions of the 
state including the executive, legislative (Assemblée Nationale and Senat), and judiciary 
branches as well as the Constitutional Council (Conseil Constitutionnel) and the Council 
of State (Conseil d’Etat) play a critical role in protecting the sovereignty of the state and 
the rights of the citizen.
3
  These and other institutions of the state not only encourage, but 
also demand, allegiance to the state and all the notions for which it stands.   
 Necessarily, this system of government, wherein the vast majority of power is 
placed in the hands of the executive, comes into conflict with the transfer of sovereignty 
necessary to participate in politics on the European level through the institutions of the 
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European Union.  An executive who is unwilling to give legitimate power to branches of 
domestic government is likely to be even more reluctant to sacrifice some of his power to 
a distant transnational governing body.  The principles of étatisme are inherently 
contradictory to political integration on the European level.  However, despite the 
apparent conflicts between étatisme and governance on the European level, France has 
been an active political participant in the European Union.  Like the citizens of other 
countries in the European Union, the general population and the elites alike have 
recognized that the European Union offers opportunities that France might otherwise not 
be afforded.
4
  French elites have been most accepting of political integration as a means 
of enacting French foreign policy on the European level and strengthening France’s 
position in the international system.  However, despite perceived benefits to European 
Union membership overall, there still remains a degree of skepticism about the relatively 
recent notion of political integration within the European Union, especially when 
France’s interests do not align with those pursued by European institutions. 
 This attitude toward Europeanization is reflected in the approach that the 
presidents of France during the Fifth Republic have taken towards Europe and European 
affairs.  The successive French leaders, though encouraging European integration to 
varying degrees, have all sought to find a way to align Europeanization with the 
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perpetuation of French political sovereignty.  Charles de Gaulle, the first president of the 
Fifth Republic, was not the most enthusiastic supporter of Europe.  He saw Europe as a 
way for France to maintain the international power that it was losing as its colonies 
became independent.  However, he was also wary of giving too much power to the 
Community, envisioning a body that was “confederal in shape and continental in scale.”
5
  
His vision of Europe is most remembered through the “Empty Chair Crisis” in the 
Council of Ministers in the 1960s.  At a time when majority voting was supposed to be 
extended within the Council, de Gaulle wanted a ‘national interest veto’ that would allow 
the national governments to continue to retain power (vis a vis the European institutions).  
De Gaulle prevented French ministers from attending any meetings until the Luxembourg 
Compromise allowed for voting based on national interest.
6
  This episode illustrates 
France’s power as a member state during this time frame and her leaders’ ability to drive 
policy formation so that it reflected French interests and goals. 
 When de Gaulle resigned in 1969, Georges Pompidou became president of 
France.  His short presidency was characterized by a different approach to Europe than de 
Gaulle had advocated.  Pompidou “took a cautious and unhurried approach to push for a 
‘twin track’ approach of intergovernmental cooperation in new policy areas and a revival 
of the dynamics of the community.”
7
  Unlike de Gaulle, who was wary of the 
enlargement of the EU, Pompidou campaigned for the inclusion of Great Britain, among 
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other states, as member states of the EU.
8
  This shift between presidencies reflects that 
while French policy is driven by étatisme, it is also influenced by the elites who are in 
power at the time.  However, it is important to note that even though Pompidou was more 
pro-European than de Gaulle, he was not nearly as pro-European as his successor. 
 Valéry Giscard d’Estaing took office when Pompidou died and built upon his 
predecessor’s support of Europe.  Giscard, whose name soon became synonymous with 
pro-European sentiment (Giscardists in contrast to the anti-European Gaullists), was a 
supporter of Europe, both through European integration and enlargement.  He 
emphasized four different policy areas during his presidency: enlargement, improving the 
effectiveness of decision-making, monetary union, and direct election of the European 
Parliament.
9
  This pro-European attitude indicated a shift that would be continued 
throughout the next presidency, that of François Mitterrand. 
 François Mitterrand took office with the hope of creating a stronger Europe that 
would be independent of United States involvement.  Despite supporting Europe, he still 
wanted France to retain control and keep the EU institutions from becoming too strong.  
He advocated a “‘concentric circles’ vision of Europe, with confederal cooperation on the 
continental scale around a federation of the EC core of advanced liberal democracies [i.e. 
France].”
10
  However, Mitterrand did not advocate for the “widening” of Europe through 
enlargement as Giscard had.  Rather, he wanted to strengthen the existing European 
coalition, through economic and monetary policy, before expanding it.
11
  Mitterrand’s 
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political leadership guided France through the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and 
through the beginning of political integration.   
 Despite the different policies pursued by the various presidents of the Fifth 
Republic, it is clear that there is a common thread that weaves them together: the use of 
Europe to serve the interests of France.  Support for Europe is somewhat superficial, with 
the political elites’ “ambivalent attitudes merely reinforc[ing] nationalist and sectoral 
criticisms of the whole EU structure...ensuring that it [the EU edifice] does not develop a 
legitimacy comparable to that of the French political system.”
12
  The effect of this 
construction is most noticeable in the perception of the EU within the French 
administration.   
The EU is perceived as distant by French citizens and administrative officials 
alike, and prior to the Maastricht Treaty, the “‘insular’ bulk of the administrative [was] 
lacking the expertise, time, or opportunity to develop a more sophisticated understanding 
of the EU’s impact on national laws.”
13
  The EU was only seen to be relevant when it was 
serving France’s already established interests and there was no need to provide officials 
with the skills or education necessary to see through the opaqueness of the EU.  Within 
France, the EU was not a priority, and in 1992, France’s delegation to COREPER was 
only 35, with representation before the ECJ limited to only five legal experts.
14
  While 
astonishing a first glance, this attitude toward the EU is a reflection of étatisme and the 
supremacy of the state above all else.  The question then becomes, is the EU always 
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destined to be politically subordinate to the nation state?  The answer to this question will 
be explored throughout the following sections of this chapter by analyzing the reaction to 
the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon, both within the French political structure 
and by elites and the general population.  Examining these changes will enable 
conclusions to be drawn about the power of the political elements of Europeanization. 
 
In The Time Of Maastricht 
The Basics of Maastricht 
 The Maastricht Treaty, formally known as the Treaty on European Union, was 
born out of years of discussion about the future of the European Union and the direction 
that its formation should take.  The Maastricht Treaty is considered to be a crucial 
moment in the formation process of the European Union, as it came at a time when faith 
in the European Union was waning.  It complemented the enactment of the Single 
European Act in 1986 and as the political extension of the EU; it strengthened EU 
institutions, a necessary correlation to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).  Signed on 
February 7, 1992 by the 12 European member states at the time, its ratification was the 
result of heated debates throughout Europe about the implications of the political 
extension of the economic union that had existed for over thirty years.
15
  The Maastricht 
Treaty pitted pro-European integrationalists throughout the continent against nationalists 
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who feared for their countries’ sovereignty.
16
   
 In France, unlike many other countries, the Maastricht Treaty was put to a vote in 
a public referendum, held in September 1992.  The Referendum served not only to 
increase awareness of the Maastricht Treaty, but simultaneously increased awareness and 
interest in the European Union as a whole.  The Referendum highlighted the divisive 
nature of European integration in France in particular.  Whereas there had been a 
significant degree of support for both the single currency and a common foreign policy, 
in opinion polls earlier in 1992, the referendum was only barely passed, by 51% of the 
population.  This change was not necessarily due to changing views about the European 
Union or Europeanization, but was a statement by the French population about 
disagreement over more general political issues.
17
  According to Ronald Tiersky, “the 
French voters changed the issue on Mitterrand in 1992, turning the Maastricht 
referendum into an ersatz national election or plebiscite,” with the election results closely 
resembling those of any national election.
18
   
However, the Maastricht Referendum was not just about the general population, 
as the debate over its ratification was driven by political elites.  European integration and 
Europeanization did not neatly divide the political landscape.  When the French 
Parliament voted on Maastricht, the center-left (the Socialists) and center-right (the 
Union for French Democracy, Social Democratic Center, and Rally for the Republic) 
supported the Treaty, collectively known as integrationalists, while the opponents, the 
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nationalists, included some of Rally for the Republic, most notably Charles Pasqua and 
Philippe Séguin, two of the most vocal opponents of the Maastricht Treaty; the National 
Front of Jean-Marie LePen; Jean-Pierre Chevènement’s Republican faction; the French 
Communists; and the Greens.
19
   
It is interesting to note that Maastricht crossed traditional political divisions and 
brought together those on the left and the right both in favor of, and in opposition to the 
Treaty.  The integrationalists, as their name suggests, “supported the strengthening of the 
political powers of the EU and its institutions” while the nationalists “wanted to ensure 
that the power of the EU would be curtailed and that it would continue to be a ‘Europe 
des patries’.”
20
  By putting the Maastricht Treaty to a referendum, Mitterrand brought to 
the fore the controversy surrounding political and economic integration, as well as the 
future of the European Union. The Maastricht Referendum was essentially a question of 
protecting French nationality, culture and sovereignty above all else (signified by a ‘no’ 
vote) or the acceptance of European integration and Europeanization as a complement to 
national power.  Ultimately, the European argument won out, not only in France but also 
throughout Europe, with the Maastricht Treaty coming into force on November 1, 1993.
21
   
 With its ratification, Maastricht became the first of the major European treaties to 
seriously address the relevance of the political sphere both on the European level and 
between member states.
22
 The Treaty of Maastricht is comprehensive, tackling economic, 
political, and social aspects of membership in the European Union.  In addition to 
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bringing about new elements and protocols, it also amended the existing European 
treaties, in an effort to provide a total revitalization of the European Union.  According to 
the European Union, five main goals were established for Maastricht, three of which 
pertain to the political realm: “strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the 
institutions…improve the effectiveness of the institutions…establish a common foreign 
and security policy.”
23
  These goals explicitly outlined for the Maastricht Treaty suggest 
that political elites throughout the EU recognized the importance of expanding the EU 
beyond merely an economic union.  Working towards these goals would result in the 
reassertion of the EU’s strength in the international system as well as an increase in its 
effectiveness of a decision-making body for the member states. 
 In order to understand the importance of the effectiveness of the EU’s institutions, 
it is necessary to know what those bodies are and how they interact with one another.  
Figure 4.1, from a document explaining the structure of the EU to the French people 
during France’s presidency of the European Council, depicts the different bodies as well 
as their functions. This brief overview will lay out the foundations necessary for 
understanding the role of various European political institutions.  Especially relevant are 
the European Commission, European Council, European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union.  Together, these institutions comprise the main decision-making, 
legislative, and administrative forces in the European Union. 
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Figure 4.1 – European Institutions
24
 
 
 
 In addition to increasing the effectiveness of the European institutions the 
Maastricht Treaty also provided conditions necessary for the closer integration of 
member states.  This change is most noticeable through the replacement of the European 
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Economic Community with the name European Community, as well as the creation of the 
European Union, the new name for the community of European states.  In these ways, 
among others, the Maastricht Treaty was the symbol of the reinvigoration of Europe on 
the world stage as well as the critical process of Europeanization that aimed at bringing 
the member states closer together in a more effective union.  However, Maastricht could 
only lay the foundations for the closer political union of the member states; putting the 
foundations to use would be the work of the member states and would only be as 
effective as they allowed it to be.   
 
Changes Brought About by Maastricht 
 The Maastricht Treaty is a lengthy document that enacted a variety of changes, 
most notably the incorporation of political and social elements of integration to 
complement the already well-established economic elements. Analyzing the nature of 
these changes and their implications enables the development of an understanding of why 
Maastricht necessitated changes in the domestic political structure of France.  Due to the 
sheer number of changes contained within the pages of Maastricht, including many 
minute details, for this study it will be most effective to concentrate on several major 
changes at the European level including the proposed Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), the increased responsibility of the European Parliament, the introduction 
and extension of new voting procedures and the establishment of the notion of EU 
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citizenship.
25
  These changes reach beyond the economic realm, reflecting the extension 
of the European Union into the political sphere.  In addition to other provisions within the 
Maastricht Treaty, they allow for the strengthening of the institutions as well as an 
increase in their effectiveness.  However, these changes do not occur without 
consequences for the member states.  By allowing a greater role of the European Union, 
member states are relinquishing a degree of their power and sovereignty.  Thus, the 
Maastricht Treaty does not only provide for the political extension of the European 
Union, but it is also an acknowledgement on the part of member states that the European 
Union deserves a greater degree of control and that they are willing to make the changes 
necessary for this to happen.   
 The four major changes outlined above each address different aspects of the 
European Union and consequently, provide unique insights into the process of European 
political integration and its implications for the member states.  Each will be addressed 
individually on the European level in this section, with the general domestic impact 
explained, while in the section that follows, specific domestic changes in France will be 
highlighted and analyzed. 
 The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was established by the 
Maastricht Treaty as one of the three pillars of the European Union, alongside the 
European Communities (EC) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).  Perhaps more than 
any other change brought about by Maastricht, the CFSP reflects a desire for member 
state cooperation beyond the economic realm.  The CFSP allows for the cooperation of 
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member states without the required intervention of an institution on the European level; it 
provides a forum for joint-initiatives in areas of common interest.
26
  The objectives of the 
CFSP, as outlined by Article J.1 of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty are as follows: 
Safeguard the common values, fundamental interest and independence of the 
Union…strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all 
ways…to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with 
the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the 
Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris charter…to promote 
international cooperation…to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of 
law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
27
  
 
For the first time in EU history, the CFSP provides a formalized structure that will enable 
EU member states to take joint action beyond the economic sphere, in this case, in the 
realm of foreign policy.  The CFSP will be implemented over time, in areas in which the 
member states share important common interests.  As such, foreign policy decisions that 
fall within these areas may become more effective because the states can cooperate and 
undertake them simultaneously.  However, when states enter into actions under the 
CFSP, they will lose a degree of autonomy, because they will no longer be acting on their 
interests alone, but based on the interests of all the involved member states (12 at the time 
of its entry into force).  Furthermore, the decision-making process becomes more 
complicated, as any CFSP decisions require approval by unanimity.
28
 
 Unanimity is one of the two major voting procedures within the European Union, 
used in addition to qualified majority voting.  Unanimity, as the name suggests, requires 
that the vote taken by member states be unanimous before a decision is reached.  Under 
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this system, each of the countries has a single vote and consequently, a single country can 
use its veto power to block the decision of all the other member states, making decision-
making a complicated process.
29
  For states such as France, who are reluctant to 
relinquish control and cherish a position of power within the EU, unanimity is the 
preferred measure of voting.  If France does not see a decision as being in its interest, it 
can effectively prevent the decision from being passed by using its power of veto.   
The second system of voting, qualified majority voting (QMV), is designed to 
check the veto power of individual states.  Under QMV, each country is allotted a certain 
number of votes, determined by the size of the country’s population.  In order for a 
decision to be passed, a threshold level of votes must be reached.
30
  As such, qualified 
majority voting eliminates the veto power inherent in unanimous voting, decreasing the 
power of individual member states vis-à-vis other member states.  No longer can France 
use its single vote to block a decision, because France’s votes alone are not enough to 
reach or threaten the threshold necessary to pass a decision.   
Under the Maastricht Treaty, QMV is “extended within the Council [Council of 
the European Union] to cover most decisions under the co-decision procedure and all 
decisions under the cooperation procedure.”
31
  The decisions under co-decision and 
cooperation combined totaled 30 articles that were added to the 50 previously existing 
articles for which QMV was considered to be the voting standard.
32
  The policy areas to 
                                                
29
 Europa, “Glossary: Unanimity,” http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/unanimity_en.htm. 
30
 Europa, “Glossary: Qualified Majority,” 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/qualified_majority_en.htm. 
31
 Europa, “Summaries of EU Legislation: Treaty of Maastricht on European.” 
32
 The Bruges Group, “Summary of Qualified Majority Voting in Successive European Treaties,” 
http://www.brugesgroup.com/news.live?article=4056&keyword=14. 
 67 
which QMV is extended are briefly addressed in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 –The Extension of QMV in Maastricht
33
 
Policy Area Relevant Articles 
Economic Policy 73c(2), 73f, 73g(1), 73g(2), 75, 103(2), 103(4), 
103(5), 103a(2), 104a(2), 104b(2), 104c(6), 
104c(14) 
Monetary Policy 105a(2), 106(5), 106(6), 109(1), 109(2), 109(3), 
109(4) 
Economic and Monetary Union 109c(3), 109f(6), 109h(2), 109h(3), 109i(3), 
109j(2), 109j(3) 
Common Visa 100c(2) and (3) 
Education 126 
Vocational Training 127 
Public Health 129 
Consumer Protection 129a 
Trans-European Networks 129d 
Research and Development  130i(4) 
Environment 130s 
Development 130w 
Ombudsman’s 138e 
Economic and Social Committee 194 
International Agreements 228(1), 228(2) 
Sanctions 228a 
 
It is interesting to note that the vast majority of areas addressed by qualified 
majority voting still fall into the economic realm.  While the extension of QMV is 
considered to be an important step in simplifying the voting process with the Council of 
Ministers, its use is still restricted.  Despite its still somewhat limited use, coupled with 
the redistribution of votes and the restructuring of the voting procedures accompanying 
the changing number of member states due to European integration, QMV effectively 
lessens the decision-making power of individual member states and reflects a push for 
increased cohesion in decision-making. Regardless of whether or not member states 
fundamentally support the reduction of their veto power within the Council, the extension 
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of QMV is an important step toward increasing the effectiveness of EU institutions, as it 
simplifies the decision-making process and prevents a single member state from blocking 
a decision in areas wherein QMV is applicable. 
Another important change contributing to the increased effectiveness of the 
institutions under the Maastricht Treaty is the establishment of the co-decision procedure.  
Specifically, co-decision is one of the critical elements that provided for the 
strengthening of the European Parliament.  As introduced in Maastricht, co-decision 
allows the European Parliament to work with the Council of the European Union to make 
decisions and enact legislation in areas wherein previously, the European parliament did 
not play an important role.  Not only does it allow for cooperation between the two 
institutions, but it also requires the Council to seek European Parliament approval before 
acting with relation to Articles 8a, 130d, 138, 228(3), 105(6) and 106(5).
34
   
This provision gives increased power to the European Parliament as the 
representative institution of the European citizens.  Furthermore, as previously 
mentioned, decisions that are made under co-decision must also be based on qualified 
majority voting, limiting the veto power of representatives in both the European 
Parliament and the Council on the European Union.  This relative loss of power for 
individual member states is one of the most significant indicators of a shift in the 
approach to the political realm within the EU.
35
  Not only is the European Parliament 
strengthened through the increased powers allotted to it, but also within the European 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers, member states are accepting diminished 
                                                
34
 UK Parliament, “Maastricht Treaty.”  
35
 Europa, “Glossary,” http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/index_en.htm. 
 69 
authority, relative to other member states and the EU as a whole. 
This power shift reflects a greater trend in the European Union, that of an 
increased role for the European Union politically, impacting both member states and their 
citizens.  The more important role of the European Union, especially in the lives of the 
citizens, is indicated by the establishment of the notion of European citizenship within the 
Maastricht Treaty.  Any citizen of any member state of the European Union is 
automatically recognized as a European citizen, in addition to their member state 
citizenship.  Though four rights of European citizens are outlined, one stands out as 
particularly relevant to the political realm of Europeanization.  The Maastricht Treaty 
gives European citizens “the right to vote and stand in local government and European 
Parliament elections in the country of residence.”
36
  This means that a citizen of one 
member state can be a candidate in a local election in another member state that he or she 
resides in.  Consequently, European citizenship has interesting implications for national 
political sovereignty in all states, but especially France, as a non-national could in theory 
be a representative in the national legislative body, among other domestic political 
institutions, as well as representative of the nation in European institutions.   
Of the changes enacted by the Maastricht Treaty, perhaps this is the most 
significant.  Though seemingly a very simple idea, its implications are immense; 
specifically, it suggests the blurring of boundaries between nation-states and the 
European Union.  For a country such as France, which is incredibly fearful of the impact 
that foreigners of any sort can have on notions of identity and culture, the advantages of 
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European citizenship make these fears very real.  Frenchmen would be shocked at the 
possibility of a Brit or a German representing their interests on a national or even 
European level.  While the creation of European citizenship does not have a direct 
institutional impact, it suggests the extent to which the political changes brought about by 
Europeanization can change the national and European landscape.  The impact stretches 
from the European institutions, to domestic institutions, to the citizens of member states.  
However, while far reaching, the political impact of Europeanization is simultaneously 
limited in scope. 
The four changes examined above, the CFSP, QMV, increased powers for the 
European Parliament and the establishment of European citizenship, when taken together 
suggest both the potential of political integration and its limitations.  Despite the 
challenges that were posed during the ratification referendum, France’s ultimate 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty suggests a willingness to accept the changes that 
were proposed by the Treaty and the limitation on national sovereignty that those changes 
necessitated.  However, the changes that were enacted were relatively limited in their 
scope, due in part to reserved ambitions because Maastricht was the first foray in the 
political sphere but also, perhaps, due to a degree of reluctance surrounding the political 
extension of the European Union.  France in particular had a very specific vision of the 
European Union, and it was that vision which drove their involvement in the Maastricht 
Treaty.  While hoping for a stronger European Union, the French decision-makers also 
wanted to retain a degree of their sovereignty and control. 
Disregarding any reluctance about the scope of the political changes enacted by 
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Maastricht, the fact is, Maastricht did provide for more political integration than had ever 
existed in the European Union.  While not creating a Union of European States, the 
Maastricht Treaty put in place the foundations necessary to start the process of closer 
political integration.  However, despite these foundations and the acceptance of the 
Maastricht Treaty’s changes on the European level, it is another thing entirely for France 
to realize their domestic implications and internalize them.  The true test of the 
effectiveness of the Maastricht Treaty and the possibility of further political integration 
comes from examining how the Treaty was incorporated into French domestic policy, 
following its ratification and implementation.   
 
France in the Post-Maastricht Period 
 After examining the changes that were brought about by Maastricht on the 
European level and understanding their implications, it is necessary to extend the study of 
Europeanization to the domestic level.  This section will look at how and to what extent 
the wave of Europeanization, as captured by the Maastricht Treaty, impacted France 
domestically.  As with the changes that occurred on the European level, addressed in the 
previous section, the domestic impact of Europeanization has simultaneously been 
extensive and limited.  This is due in large part to the perception that France has of 
Europeanization overall.   The French have a certain vision for the future of the European 
Union, as an entity that does not replace the state but rather, complements it.  When the 
direction of European Union legislation aligns with this vision, the French are avid 
supporters of European integration.  However, when the EU fails to match with their 
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vision, the French become cautiously nationalistic and eager to express their opposition.  
While this is traditionally the dichotomy with which France approaches European affairs, 
when examining France’s reaction to the Maastricht Treaty, a slightly more moderate 
approach can be seen, wherein France shows signs of entertaining policies that once 
might have been vehemently opposed. 
 There are three different impacts of the Maastricht Treaty that are useful to 
examine in attempting to draw conclusions about the political impact of Europeanization.  
First, and perhaps most objective, is the impact on the French Constitution, as understood 
through the deliberations of the French Constitutional Council.  Second, are the changes 
that occurred within the institutional structure of France.  Lastly, the impact on the 
general public and their perception of the EU politically and its institutions, provides a 
third perspective of Europeanization.  These changes illustrate both the tension 
surrounding European integration in France, but also the ever so subtle acceptance of a 
new perception of Europeanization. 
 
The Constitutional Impact of Maastricht  
 The proceedings of the French Constitutional Council, both April 7-9, 1992 and 
September 2, 1992, suggest a willingness to consider Europeanization in a positive light.  
The French Constitutional Council first met to discuss the Maastricht Treaty and its 
constitutional implications in April 1992, the proceedings of which are known as 
Maastricht 1.  The goal of this meeting was to review the Maastricht Treaty alongside the 
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French Constitution to ensure their mutual compatibility.
37
  Prior to analyzing the 
substance of Maastricht, the Council made an important distinction, that: 
It follows from these various institutional provisions that respect for national 
sovereignty does not preclude France, acting in accordance with the Preamble to 
the 1946 Constitution, from concluding international agreements for participation 
in the establishment or development of a permanent international organization 
enjoying legal personality and decision-making powers on the basis of transfers of 
power decided on by the Member States, subject to reciprocity.
38
 
 
In this statement, the Council recognizes that a transfer of power between the member 
states and the European Union does necessarily threaten the notion of national 
sovereignty held by France.  However, the mention of reciprocity suggests that there are 
certain conditions that must be satisfied in order for such a transfer of power to be 
considered acceptable.  As such, the French Constitutional Council both allows for, and 
requires, the further examination of specific topics contained within the Maastricht 
Treaty, including Reciprocal Agreements and the Establishment of Union Citizenship, 
among others (not political in nature).  Interestingly, in the thorough analysis conducted 
by the Council, only a single article of political importance in Maastricht was found to be 
unconstitutional.  That article, Article 8b (1), pertains to the right of EU citizens to vote 
and participate in municipal elections in countries other than that of their national 
citizenship.
39
 (NB: Other articles were found to be unconstitutional, but as pertains to 
political articles addressed in this decision, only Article 8b (1) is relevant)  The notion of 
European citizenship is an incredibly controversial issue because it changes the role of 
both national and non-nationals in domestic elections.  European citizenship runs 
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extremely contrary to the French understanding of French political identity, and as such, 
is an issue that must be addressed before Maastricht could be ratified. 
 The analysis of Maastricht also came to another relevant conclusion: 
The Treaty on European Union does not have the effect of changing the legal 
status of the European Parliament; the Parliament is not a sovereign assembly 
with general lawmaking power such as might participate in the exercise of 
national sovereignty; it belongs to a sui generis legal order, which, although 
integrated into the legal system of various Member States, is not part of the 
institutional system of the French republic.
40
 
 
This statement illustrates the recognition of an important division between EU decision-
making and national decision-making that enables the French to justify a transfer of 
powers to the European Parliament while still upholding their sovereignty and their 
vision of the European Union as a corollary, rather than replacement, to the member 
state.  Though the European Parliament in theory gained strength and decision-making 
power as a result of the Maastricht Treaty, France still recognizes the superiority of its 
national legislative bodies, such as the Senate and the National Assembly.  Important 
steps may have been taken to increase the effectiveness of the European Parliament, but 
this effectiveness does not necessarily translate into increased recognition of the 
legitimacy of the European Parliament by France or its citizens.  In this statement, the 
French Constitutional Council is asserting that it does not recognize the European 
Parliament as a replacement for national legislative institutions.  France is projecting its 
own image of what the European Union should be on top of the image of what the 
European Union is.   
 Though the image of the European Union that France held might not have aligned 
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exactly with the one projected by the Maastricht Treaty, the appropriate changes were 
made to the French Constitution so that the Maastricht Treaty could be ratified.  These 
changes not only indicate the recognition of the political relevance of the European 
Union but further suggest that either the misalignment was not significant or that France 
was willing to change its image so that it aligned with what was being projected by the 
European Union at the time.  
 The second meeting of the Constitutional Council, referred to Maastricht 2, was 
held after the requested changes were made to the French Constitution, ensuring that 
Maastricht was no longer in conflict with it.  The appropriate changes were made as a 
result of Constitutional Act 92-554 on June 25, 1992 and included the introduction of a 
new section of the French Constitution, Title XV – On the European Communities and 
the European Union.
41
  Title XV encompassed several articles including Article 88-1, 
which is the formal recognition of the European Union and Article 88-3, which addresses 
the concerns of the Constitutional Council with relation to Maastricht Article 8b (1).  
Through Article 88-3, France regulates the participation of EU citizens in their national 
government.  France does not accept European citizenship as outlined in the Maastricht 
Treaty, but rather amends it and restricts the participation of EU citizens in national 
elections, to protect French national interest, identity and sovereignty.  Article 88-4 was 
also added to address the relationship between the French legislative branch and the EU 
as a whole.
42
 By requiring the National Assembly and the Senate to be given drafts of 
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proposed European legislation, a check on European institutions is put in place.  The 
same article also simultaneously establishes committees for European Affairs in both 
legislative branches.  Though the European Union may have been less important in 
France prior to the Maastricht Treaty, this indicates recognition of the increasing 
importance of European Affairs and the need to address them domestically.  While 
France may be wary of Europeanization, it does not deny its increasing relevance. 
 
Institutions and Politicians React to Maastricht 
 The strengthening of institutions addressing the European Union and European 
affairs in domestic France echoes this recognition of the importance of taking 
Europeanization into account.  While the French might be skeptical of Europeanization, 
by addressing it domestically they can work to come to an understanding of how 
domestic policy goals can be meshed with the goals of the European Union.  
Furthermore, developing a more thorough understanding of Europeanization allows the 
French to be better prepared for the challenges that it might present.  Prior to the 
Maastricht Treaty, European affairs did not register on the radar of most politicians and 
were considered to be significantly less important and relevant than domestic affairs.  
While Maastricht did not single handedly reverse the opinion of French politicians, their 
reactions to the Maastricht Treaty indicate recognition of Europeanization as force to be 
dealt with. 
 Examining the responsibilities of the General Secretariat of the Inter-ministerial 
Committee for Question on European Economic Cooperation (SCGI) illustrates perhaps 
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the most significant change within domestic French structure.  This position, which has 
existed in France since 1948, was initially charged with managing the implementation of 
the Marshall Plan in France.  The responsibilities of the SCGI have evolved over time, in 
accordance with the development of the EU.  The most noticeable change, however, 
occurred in the 1990s, following the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty.  After the 
Maastricht Treaty was put in place, the SCGI was given responsibility for overseeing 
those areas of policy that fell under the Justice and Home Affairs pillar of the Maastricht 
Treaty.  However, the SCGI’s duties were extended beyond France’s borders, with him 
serving as somewhat of a liaison between France and the EU.
43
 Included in the list of 
responsibilities are: “insuring interministerial coordination of French representatives in 
Brussels…organizing a smooth flow of information between the national level and the 
European level…keeping the Parliament informed of governmental bills to the EU.”
44
  
The SCGI serves to coordinate relations between the national government and the EU 
institutions, while also maintaining an archive of European legislation for reference at the 
national level.  The increased role of the SCGI allows France to be more knowledgeable 
of the EU and essentially keep tabs on the actions and decisions of the European Union.  
In this way, combined with the committees within the Senate and National Assembly, 
France can to a degree attempt to regulate the direction of the EU and retain some of its 
control.  Regardless of the motives behind increasing the SCGI’s authority, this change is 
indicative of a larger trend related to the domestic impact of Europeanization in France.   
In the post-Maastricht period, increased cohesion became characteristic of 
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France’s approach to the European Union and its European foreign policy.  Furthermore, 
elite discourse during this period emphasizes the importance of recognizing the value of 
the EU and reconciling it within French domestic institutions.  Though the French may 
not necessarily always agree with the policies of the European Union, it is necessary to 
continue to support the EU, as Giscard explained in an interview during his tenure in the 
European Parliament: 
The idea of European unity is a French idea.  If we refused to approve the treaty 
which is the next step in the union of Europe, we would signal an end to an idea 
that for 40 years has been constant in France.  Then tell them that if we do not 
ratify the Maastricht Treaty, we might see the gradual dismantling of the 
Community.
45
 
 
Once again, Giscard emphasizes the centrality of France in the construction of the EU.  
Because the goals of the Maastricht Treaty are in accord with the French perception of 
the EU, political elites supported its ratification and implementation.  Jacques Delors 
echoed Giscard’s sentiment, explaining that Maastricht would provide the strength that 
the EU needed to reassert the influence of the member states on the world through the 
dominance of the EU.
46
  The post-Maastricht period was an important moment in time, as 
the French elites came to realize that a strengthened, political EU could provide an 
additional avenue through which they could pursue their policies and goals.  Thus, when 
François Mitterrand emphasized that “it [Maastricht] must be ratified,” he was motivated 
by a desire to reassert France’s authority in the international system.
47
  The Maastricht 
Treaty enabled French political elites to change their conception of the EU and 
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emphasize the possibilities that it held for France.  
  
Perception of the General Public 
 The change in opinion among the political elites in France was also accompanied 
by an overall heightened awareness of the European Union on the domestic level.  
Whereas many of the changes enacted by the Maastricht Treaty have had a limited impact 
on the general public, in an overarching sense, Maastricht’s most observable effect for 
the general population has been increased visibility for the European Union.  Public 
opinion surveys conducted by the European Union, through the Eurobarometer, reflect 
this trend.  Most notably, the Maastricht Treaty increased awareness among the citizens 
of France with regards to the institutions.  Between 1991 and 1992, awareness of the 
European Parliament increased from 38% to 54%.
48
  Though there were fluctuations in 
the percentages of the population responding positively during that time period, the 
general trend is toward increased awareness.  This trend is also echoed by awareness of 
the European Commission, which increased from 37% to 50% from 1991 to 1993.
49
  This 
change in awareness level, coupled with the increasing powers of the European Union, 
enabled French citizens to better understand how the EU could and would impact their 
lives in the post-Maastricht period.  Whereas prior to Maastricht, the EU was seen as a 
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distant and relatively unimportant body, in this period it took on a more tangible role in 
international affairs and the lives of French citizens alike.  
Indicative of this new perception of the EU as a possible actor, during this time 
the general population also became more eager to see the EU take a degree of political 
control.  When asked about their attitudes towards political union, half to three quarters 
of the French surveyed responded that they were in favor of joint foreign policy as well 
as joint security and defense policy.
50
  Interestingly, despite this trend indicating an 
increased awareness and acceptance of the European Union, responses to other surveys 
suggest a different story.  While 63% of the French were in favor of a European 
government responsible to the European Parliament in 1991, by 1993 that number had 
dropped to 49%.
51
  Similarly, though not such a drastic change, the percentage of the 
French population surveyed that desired a more important role for the European 
Parliament, decreased from 65% to 58% between the beginning of the 1991 and the end 
of 1992.
52
  This could be a reaction to the actual increased role of the European 
Parliament, or it could reflect a desire to keep the power of the EU from becoming too 
great.  The dichotomy observed within the results of Eurobarometer public opinion 
surveys from Maastricht and post-Maastricht period reflect the greater climate in France 
surrounding Europeanization and political sovereignty in the early 1990s.  
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Balancing Europeanization 
The post-Maastricht period in France was one of cautious optimism.  While 
France was hopeful of the opportunities that would be afforded them by a stronger, more 
effective EU, its leaders were also worried about the domestic impact and loss of 
sovereignty that would necessarily accompany those changes.  There is no doubt that as a 
result of the Maastricht Treaty, there were political changes enacted on both the European 
and domestic levels.  Institutions on the EU level were strengthened, while domestic 
institutions were adjusted to reflect the increasing importance of the European Union as 
an institution.  However, these changes did not go unchecked.   
In the post-Maastricht era, France was caught between retaining sovereignty and 
contributing to the strength of the EU.  Despite ratifying the Maastricht Treaty which no 
doubt had the effect of limiting its political sovereignty, to a degree, as the public opinion 
surveys indicate, there was a still a degree of skepticism as pertained to the EU and 
renouncing political sovereignty.  That skepticism is understandable.  The involvement of 
the European Union in the political realm was a very new development at this time.  
There was a learning curve present for both European and domestic political leaders.  
Furthermore, the institutions of both the member states and the European Union would 
need to be adapted to reflect what this new development would mean for their power 
relationship.   
The uncertainty surrounding the future of the EU and the member states was 
clearly reflected in France’s political reaction to the Maastricht Treaty.  Maastricht was 
taking strides to political integration, but France was also pulling back.  Many of the 
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domestic adaptations in France, while seemingly recognizing EU’s increasing relevance, 
can also be interpreted as an attempt to keep the growing power of the EU in check.  
French political leaders hope to simultaneously support the growth and development of 
the EU while holding on to their vision of the EU as limited in scope and strength.  This 
internal tug-of-war would no doubt pose a challenge to the future of Europeanization; 
only time would tell how Europeanization would progress politically.  Would France win 
out and be able to retain its sovereignty, would the EU continue to demand an increased 
degree of control or would a balance be found somewhere in between?  
 
The EU Constitution, Lisbon, and Beyond 
The European Constitution: A Foundation for the Treaty of Lisbon 
 Following the effectiveness of the Maastricht Treaty and two treaties that 
followed, the Treaty of Amsterdam (signed in 1997, in effect 1999) and the Treaty of 
Nice (signed 2000, in effect 2003), the member states of the European Union decided the 
time was right to take a greater step towards closer integration.
53
  On October 29, 2004 
the 25 European Union member states at the time came together in Rome to sign an 
important document, the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe.  The basis for the 
Treaty was put in place along with the Treaty of Nice, but nearly four years of meetings 
of the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) were needed to come up with a plan of 
action.  Among the goals of the Treaty, in addition to providing for stronger ties between 
member states, was the simplification of the European Union that had become complex 
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and convoluted after fifty years of treaties and legislation.
54
  The Constitutional Treaty 
was broken down into four parts, each with specific areas of relevance shown in Table 
4.2. 
Table 4.2: The Structure of the EU Constitution
55
 
Section Subject Titles Addressed 
I Principles, objectives and 
institutional provisions of the 
EU 
the definition and objectives of the 
Union; fundamental rights and 
citizenship of the Union; Union 
competences; the Union's institutions; 
the exercise of Union competence; the 
democratic life of the Union; the 
Union's finances; the Union and its 
neighbours; Union membership. 
 
II European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights 
dignity; freedoms; equality; solidarity; 
citizens' rights; justice; general 
provisions. 
 
III Provisions governing the 
policies and the functioning of 
the Union 
provisions of general application; non-
discrimination and citizenship; internal 
policies and action; association of the 
overseas countries and territories; the 
Union's external action; the functioning 
of the Union; common provisions. 
 
IV General and Final Provisions  
 
Though signed by all 25 Member States, in theory in recognition of their support 
for the project, the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty proved to be an 
insurmountable challenge, especially in France.  France’s support of the Maastricht 
Treaty, the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Nice over the past decade would have 
suggested increasing acceptance of Europeanization, the rejection of the Constitutional 
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Treaty tells another story, one that had been developing over the past decade as well.  As 
a Constitution, the implications of the Treaty were far greater than those of any of the 
treaties that had been passed since Maastricht.  Most importantly, the Constitution would 
have given the EU new political powers and further increased its authority as an 
international institution, calling into question the relationship between the EU and the 
member states once again.
56
 
 Consequently, the French voted no because of “national concerns about the 
tremendous changes France has experience as a result of European integration and 
globalization, in particular since the mid-1980s.”
57
  With the Constitution, the French 
feared that their conception of Europe, as a corollary to the nation-state, was being 
jeopardized.  Through the Constitution, they saw their already diminished power reduced 
even further and what little prestige remained being put into question.  The French were 
afraid not just of Europeanization but of the larger trend of globalization that it 
represented.  They worried that the Constitution would threaten their national identity, 
culture, and sovereignty. 
Though, as was also seen with the Maastricht Referendum in 1992, the French 
“non” was not motivated simply by perceptions of Europeanization but by underlying 
domestic issues as well, the rejection had enormous implications for the future of the 
European Union.  France may not be the grand leader of the European Union that it once 
was but it is still one of the larger and more important member states.  The impact that its 
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“non” had on the European community indicates that France remains influential in the 
European Union.  The failure of ratification not only in France but in the Netherlands as 
well, prompted a period of reflection on the future of the European Union, which 
ultimately led to the creation of the Treaty of Lisbon.
58
 
 
The Basics of the Treaty of Lisbon 
 Emerging as a “Plan B” of Europeanization out of the failed ratification of the 
European Constitution, the Treaty of Lisbon is the most recent step toward increasing 
integration among the EU member states.  Signed on December 13, 2007, following a 
summit in Lisbon, Portugal, the Treaty of Lisbon went into effect on December 1, 2009.  
After France and the Netherlands failed to ratify the Treaty Establishing a Constitution 
for Europe, the member states had to return to the drawing board to come up with a 
compromise. At the Brussels European Council of June 21 and 22, 2007, European 
leaders came to agreement and decided to put into practice a reform treaty rather than a 
constitution.   
As a treaty, rather than a constitution, the implications of Lisbon were not as 
significant.  This is most noticeable in a language change wherein in the laws and 
framework laws mentioned in the Constitution are replaced by the conventional 
terminology of regulations and directives.
59
  Though at the core, the message of the two 
documents remains very similar, to provide for the increasing integration of the EU 
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member states, the way in which the contents are presented speaks to the complexity of 
and the challenges posed by European integration.   
The Treaty of Lisbon was put into place with the objectives of: 
Mak[ing] the EU more democratic, meeting the European citizens’ expectation 
for high standards of accountability, openness, transparency and participation; and 
to make the EU more efficient and able to tackle today’s global challenges such as 
climate change, security and sustainable development.
60
 
 
This statement alludes to the overarching goal of Lisbon: to improve the functionality of 
the EU so that it could better serve the people of Europe.  Politically, Lisbon emphasized 
the creation of efficient and modern institutions including the European Parliament, 
European Council, Council of the EU, and European Commission.
61
  In conjunction with 
the improvement of the institutions Lisbon also called for a more transparent and 
democratic Europe.  This goal would be achieved by increasing the powers of the 
European Parliament, giving the national parliaments a more significant role, increasing 
transparency in the Council of Ministers, increasing participatory democracy and 
building the relationship between the EU and its member countries.
62
   
France’s much more enthusiastic support of the Treaty of Lisbon, as opposed to 
the Constitutional Treaty, perfectly illustrates its hot and cold approach to 
Europeanization.  When the French perception of Europeanization aligns with the 
approach being undertaken by the EU, as it did with Lisbon, then French support is likely 
strong.  However, when France’s perception does not align with the EU’s vision, as in the 
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case of the Constitutional Treaty, then France becomes a staunch opponent to 
Europeanization.  Though France may not be the influential power that it once was, it still 
plays an important role in the EU and its support is necessary for Europeanization to 
progress.  Thanks in part to France’s acceptance of it, the Treaty of Lisbon has already 
resulted in important changes on the European level and is beginning to have an impact 
on the domestic level as well.   
 
Changes Brought About by Lisbon 
 At this point in the integration and Europeanization process, many member states 
are ready for sweeping changes that will lead to ever-closer union.  While they may have 
had to concede some of their grander visions, the Treaty of Lisbon, though more 
moderate, still provides for a variety changes on the European level.  These changes 
include: structural evolution within the major institutions, new decision-making 
procedures, the creation of new positions, and an increased role for the nation-states in 
European institutions.
63
  While somewhat limited in scope, these changes are an 
important stepping-stone as the process of Europeanization moves forward.  Sometimes, 
it is necessary to make small concessions to keep the process moving, rather than halt the 
process entirely by demanding too much.   
 As a result of the Treaty of Lisbon, the size of the European Parliament will be 
limited to 751 members (750 representatives and the president).
64
 Each country is 
required to have at least six seats and may have no more than 96 seats, allotted by 
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degressive proportionality.
65
  The larger the size of a member state, the more seats it will 
be given in Parliament.
66
  However, the cap on the number of seats, combined with 
voting regulations, limits the power of single states to sway decisions within the 
legislative body.  Furthermore, by increasing the number of representatives, the vote of 
each individual Member of Parliament becomes less and less important.  The evolution of 
the role of Parliament, and the relative power of the states within it, highlights the 
diminished role that France is accepting with each successive EU treaty. 
 Within the European Commission as well, the power of each individual member 
state is limited.  Whereas previous treaties limited the number of commissioners to a 
portion of member states, the Treaty of Lisbon “offers the perspective that a 
Commissioner from each Member State becomes Member of the Commission.”
67
  This 
means that each member state is given a say in the affairs and decision-making of the 
Commission, at all times, rather than just when the Commissioner is allowed to be part of 
the Commission.  Now decisions must take into account all 25 member states, lessening 
the chances that a single state can possibly block a decision made by the body.
68
  In this 
way, the Treaty of Lisbon makes a further push to protect the public interest of all EU 
citizens. 
 The European Council as well sees an increase in its effectiveness due to the 
Treaty of Lisbon.  Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Council becomes a “full EU 
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institution”.
69
  A new system is put in place wherein in the European Council will elect 
the President of the Council for a term of two and a half years, renewable once, replacing 
the current rotational system.
70
  This new system will hopefully allow for increased 
continuity and efficiency within the European Council.  This change could either benefit 
or harm France.  Under this system, if a French politician is voted into the presidency, he 
will have control of the Council for two and a half years.  However, if a politician from 
another country is chosen, particularly one with radically different views than France, 
problems could arise.  France’s willingness to take this gamble and eliminate its 
guaranteed presidency once every 25 years is a glimmer of hope for the future of 
Europeanization. 
 These structural adjustments within the institutions are accompanied by critical 
changes in the decision-making procedures within the institutions.  Most notably, the co-
decision procedure that was put in place under Maastricht becomes the “ordinary 
legislative procedure” and is extended to be relevant in 40 different fields.
71
  By giving 
more power to the European Parliament, co-decision is designed to provide an increased 
layer of protection for the interests of the general population.
72
  Qualified majority voting 
is extended in the Council once again, replacing unanimity. A new type of voting is 
introduced as well, a double majority voting system, which will come into effect in 2014.  
In order to pass an act, 55% of the EU member states (15 out of 27) and 65% of the 
population of the EU must support the decision.  To block a decision, there must be at 
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least four states in opposition.
73
  This new system of voting indicates a desire to balance 
voting within the EU.  It limits the power of the larger member states (such as France) by 
requiring the accompanying percentage of population of the EU for a decision to be 
approved, emphasizing the importance of the people within the EU.
74
 These changes, and 
those in the institutions as well, reflect an ever-so-slight shift in perspective.  No longer 
are the member states the sole factor to be considered in the decision-making procedure.  
With the Treaty of Lisbon, there is an increased emphasis placed on the importance of the 
citizens of member states as EU citizens as well.  The focus of the EU is changing and 
evolving along with Europeanization. 
 In addition to changes within existing EU institutions and positions, two new 
positions are created as a result of the Treaty of Lisbon.  Already mentioned briefly, the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is put into 
place as the representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy.  He/she is also the 
President of the Foreign Affairs Council and the Vice-President of the Commission.
75
  
According to the EU, the High Representative “should ensure consistency in the EU’s 
dealings with foreign countries and international bodies.”
76
  While the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is responsible for the 
EU’s foreign relations, the European External Action Service serves as resource for 
diplomacy within and between the member states.  The European External Action 
Service “comprise[s] officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the 
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Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic 
services.”
77
  Its responsibility is to work with the member states with regard to various 
aspects of diplomacy to ensure cohesion on the national and European level.
78
  These 
changes set an example for member states that might be skeptical of Europeanization by 
suggesting that European affairs and the cooperation of member states in the political 
realm is important.   
 The Treaty of Lisbon not only has an impact on the European level but on the 
national level as well.  Most notably, the Treaty of Lisbon provides an increased role for 
the national parliaments.  Each national parliament is now given eight weeks to examine 
drafts of European legislation before it is enacted.
79
  Even more importantly, the national 
parliaments have the power to block legislation: 
If a sufficient number of national parliaments is convinced that a legislative 
initiative should better be taken a local, regional, or national level, the 
Commission either has to withdraw it or give a clear justification why it does not 
believe that the initiative is in breach with the principle of subisidiarity.
80
 
 
This new emphasis on the national parliaments serves as a check on the power of the 
European Union and the institutions.  Presumably, the national parliaments will now have 
more control over European legislation and possibly an increased say in the way that EU 
policies unfold.   For a country such as France that worries about the direction of the EU, 
this element of the Treaty of Lisbon provides an opportunity to retain a degree of control.  
Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon provides the explicit definition of different 
categories of powers, indicating a division of responsibility between member states and 
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the EU.  Exclusive powers are those reserved for the EU; shared powers are those in 
which responsibility is shared between member states and the EU; and support, 
coordinating, or complementary action requires the EU to support the actions of member 
states.
81
  In this way, an interesting dynamic of dependency is created, wherein neither 
the member states nor the EU has complete control.  This allows France to retain a degree 
of sovereignty in the realm of support, coordinating, or complementary actions, but it also 
forces France to support the EU’s decisions in the realm of exclusive powers, even if the 
decision does not align with France’s views.  In order for EU integration and 
Europeanization to be further successful, it is necessary to create a balance between the 
member states and the European Institutions. 
  The Treaty of Lisbon also gives powers to the citizens, through a new citizens’ 
initiative, which allows one million EU citizens to petition the Commission to address an 
issue that falls under EU jurisdiction.
82
  The citizens’ initiative reflects the trend 
mentioned earlier, wherein the Treaty of Lisbon places an increased importance on the 
notion of European citizenship and those who hold it.  Just as member states are 
accountable to their citizens, so the EU is accountable to its citizens as well, albeit on a 
much grander scale.  These new powers afforded to citizens and member states by the 
Treaty of Lisbon complement the strengthening of control on the European level and also 
acknowledge their continued relevance and importance as actors in European and 
international affairs, despite the growing relevance of the EU as well. 
 Though the Treaty of Lisbon increased the power of the EU and strengthens its 
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institutions, it also provides for restrictions on the EU’s powers, through increased 
transparency and a more important role for the national parliaments and European 
citizens.
83
  Interestingly, this dichotomy is a very close reflection of France’s perception 
of the ideal European Union.  This European Union is effective, but not so effective that 
it replaces the nation-states that give it power and authority.  The Treaty of Lisbon 
reflects the delicate balance between the EU and member states that must be achieved in 
order to increase the political power of the EU.  France is willing to give, but it also needs 
to feel as though it is receiving benefits as well.  Because of the complexity of give and 
take, the progression of Europeanization is slow.  However, the Treaty of Lisbon can be 
seen as a continuation of the changes enacted by the Maastricht Treaty, suggesting that 
Europeanization is slow but steady.  The impact of Europeanization can be further 
understood by examining the way in which the changes that were enacted on the 
European level by the Treaty of Lisbon are internalized on the national level. 
 
The Domestic Impact of Lisbon 
 As the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force fewer than six months ago, its impact is 
somewhat difficult to interpret.  While there are some changes that can be observed, more 
time is necessary to gather concrete evidence that can be used to understand the political 
impact of the Treaty of Lisbon and the process of Europeanization.  Despite the limited 
amount of information available, preliminary conclusions can still be drawn based on the 
examination of the French Constitution, the discourse of political elites and recent public 
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opinion.  Most importantly, observations of these various subjects reflect that the process 
of political integration within the EU is progressing. 
 The deliberation of the French Constitutional Council on the Treaty of Lisbon on 
December 20, 2007, provides relevant insights into some of the broader political changes 
that are necessary in France to adopt the Treaty.  Speaking to the more extensive reach of 
the Treaty of Lisbon, the Constitutional Council found it necessary to make many more 
changes to the Constitution, especially politically than it did when the Maastricht Treaty 
was examined.
84
  While indeed the Treaty of Lisbon was broader in scope, the number of 
changes could be also be attributed to increasing wariness of the growing strength of the 
EU, especially in the wake of the Constitutional Treaty referendum.   
 However, the willingness of the Constitutional Council to recommend a wide 
range of changes to the French Constitution to rectify the disjunction with the Treaty of 
Lisbon, suggests that Europeanization does in fact have a positive effect.  After the 
changes required by Maastricht and subsequent treaties, the French government is more 
willing to enact further changes. One of the most striking observations of the 
Constitutional Council is point 18, “the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon which transfer 
to the European Union under the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ powers inherent in the 
exercising of national sovereignty require a revision of the Constitution.”
85
  This 
statement can be interpreted as France’s willingness to accept the transfer of a degree of 
its sovereignty to the European Union, a shocking development when thinking of 
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France’s centralization. 
 There are also a number of other amendments to the French constitution that were 
required by Lisbon including: a transfer of powers in new areas, new manners of 
exercising powers that were already transferred, the adoption of qualified majority voting 
under a subsequent European decision, simplified revision procedures, and new powers 
vested in national parliaments in the framework of the Union.
86
  As a result of these 
changes, the five previous articles pertaining to the European Union within the French 
Constitution are to be modified and two new articles are to be included, Articles 88-6 and 
88-7.  Both articles pertain to the new powers of the national parliament with relation to 
the EU.
87
  Interestingly, despite all the changes necessitated by the Treaty of Lisbon, 
never once in the deliberation is there any mention of the possibility of not ratifying the 
Treaty of Lisbon.  The changes, then, most likely are in accord with the vision that 
France holds of the EU.  France’s acceptance of a greater number of changes and a treaty 
with a broader scope than any previously ratified, suggests that Europeanization is having 
somewhat of a positive impact on one of the most reluctant member states. 
 In fact, the Treaty of Lisbon received support from a number of political elites in 
France including Nicolas Sarkozy, Bernard Kouchner, Pierre Lellouche and Joseph Daul.  
Tellingly, in a speech on December 16, 2008 at the end of his term as President of the 
Council, Sarkozy explained, “I tried to change Europe, but Europe changed me.”
88
  This 
brief line speaks volumes about the power of Europeanization to influence opinions and 
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decisions.  The more deeply one is involved in European affairs, the easier it is to 
understand the value of increased integration.  The opinions of the other leaders suggest 
that Europe has changed the overall perception of the EU in France as well, at least 
politically.  In a joint statement on December 1, 2009, Kouchner and Lellouche lauded 
the Treaty of Lisbon explaining that Lisbon “completes an institutional process begun 20 
years ago…to tailor our institutions to EU enlargement and the challenges of 
globalization…with these institutions, we are better equipped to provide the political 
response European citizens are waiting for.”
89
  Daul also echoes this sentiment, 
explaining, “we are giving the EU the necessary tools for it to function effectively.”
90
   
Interestingly, despite these overwhelmingly positive impressions of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, there is still a degree of reservation with regards to political integration.  In 
February 2008, Sarkozy made a speech after the passing of the bill that authorized the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and emphasized Lisbon as a treaty, rather than the failed 
constitution.  There are important political distinctions between a treaty and a 
constitution, with a treaty having a more superficial political impact than a constitution.
91
  
The importance of this distinction suggests that the French are still not entirely 
comfortable with the idea of political integration.  Daul as well echoes this French vision 
of the EU explaining, “we do not want a European State…we want super efficiency, 
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democracy, transparency and the respect of subsidiarity.”
92
  Under the principle of 
subsidiarity, the EU only acts when it is more effective than actors on the local, regional, 
or national level.
93
  This restriction on the power of EU accords with the approach that 
the French have taken to Europeanization and political integration.  The French have a 
very distinct conception of the “best” EU and will support political integration only in so 
far as that vision is upheld. 
 This distinct vision of the EU is not restricted to French political elites.  Rather, 
this conception of Europe is one shared by the general French population. In 2009, when 
asked about their vision, 44% of French citizens surveyed responded that they wanted a 
“Europe of States” in which states have the choice of whether or not they want to 
cooperate with other states.  However, 33% of French were in favor of increased 
integration, while still respecting the rights of states.  Only 14% wanted the EU to 
become a supranational government.
94
  As mentioned continuously throughout this 
chapter, the French are supportive of Europeanization, but only so long as it creates a 
Europe that matches their vision of what Europe should be.   
 Over the past decade, due in large part to the increasing awareness of the 
European Union, what it stands for and what it does, the French public has become more 
comfortable with the notion of Europeanization.  However, there still remains a large 
degree of skepticism surrounding the European Union and how it will impact the future 
of France.  Since the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon, trust in European institutions has 
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been falling. Trust in the European Parliament dropped from 58% in 2007 to 44% in 2009 
and trust in the European Commission fell from 54% in 2007 to 39% in 2009.  However, 
! of the French population considered the role played by the European Parliament and 
the European Commission as “important”.
95
  Once again, the duality of French opinions 
towards Europeanization is evident. However, it is important to notice that the loss of 
trust in EU institutions occurs at the same time when the Treaty of Lisbon is aiming to fix 
such problems.  As no surveys have been conducted since the implementation of Lisbon, 
it is possible that as a result of Lisbon, this downward trend will be reversed. 
 A study of the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon in France presents interesting 
evidence about the process of Europeanization in the political realm in France.  For the 
general public, the most significant impact of Europeanization has been increased 
awareness of the political institutions on the European level, as well as sustained support 
a degree of joint-decision making.
96
  Within domestic institutions, despite continued 
skepticism surrounding the EU and its role, there is a willingness to allow the EU to take 
a certain degree of control, so long as France still retains what it deems to be the “right” 
amount of control.  The period following the Maastricht Treaty, leading up to and 
including the Treaty of Lisbon, shows that political integration is possible, so long as 
certain conditions are met.  In order to support Europeanization, the French must believe 
that their vision of Europe is being realized.  As such, process of political 
                                                
95
 Commission of the European Communities, Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European 
Community, 69, November 2007; Commission of the European Communities, Eurobarometer: Public 
Opinion in the European Community, 70, December 2008; Commission of the European Communities, 
Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Community, 71, September 2009; Commission of the 
European Communities, Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Community, 72, December 2009. 
96
 Commission of the European Communities, 69; Commission of the European Communities, 70; 
Commission of the European Communities, 71; Commission of the European Communities, 72. 
 99 
Europeanization requires the delicate balancing of European efficacy and national 
sovereignty.  Though political integration may be slow and incomplete, with time, closer 
union is possible. 
 
Conclusion 
 The almost twenty year period that begins with the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty and ends with the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon provides important 
insights into understanding the way in which Europeanization and changes within the 
European Union impact domestic political structures and perceptions of the European 
Union.  The Maastricht Treaty, as the first introduction of the elements of political 
integration, was somewhat limited in its scope.  However, it laid important foundations 
that enabled Europeanization to progress throughout the 1990s and into the new 
millennium.  The Treaty of Lisbon builds on the foundations of Maastricht, as well as 
those set by the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, to propose more extensive political 
integration.   
 Though Europeanization has progressed significantly since the early 1990s, the 
process has been neither smooth, nor simple.  In France especially, with the ratification of 
each new treaty, the debate between the pro-Europeans and the Euroskeptics was 
reinvigorated.  The pro-Europeans and Euroskeptics were most vocal with the Maastricht 
Treaty, the EU Constitution and the Treaty of Lisbon, using referendums and debates as 
opportunity to express discontent over domestic and European policies alike.  The pro-
Europeans argued that further integration in the EU would be beneficial for France, 
 100 
enabling it to reassert some of its lost authority.  The Euroskeptics, on the other hand, 
believed that too much integration would threaten and dilute French sovereignty: 
political, social, and economic.  Between the period of the Maastricht Treaty and the 
Treaty of Lisbon, the pro-Europeans can be declared the winners of the debate, with their 
support of the treaties enabling their ratification.  
 However, the process of Europeanization cannot be understood merely through a 
legislative perspective.  The true test of the efficacy of Europeanization is the realization 
of tangible changes, on both the domestic and European levels.  Both Maastricht and 
Lisbon brought about institutional change within the EU, leading to the strengthening of 
EU institutions.  The changes on the European level as a result of Maastricht helped to 
encourage domestic changes in the period that followed the treaty being put into effect.  
Furthermore, the changes in the early to mid-1990s paved the way for the closer 
integration that accompanied the Treaty of Lisbon when it went into effect in December 
2009.  Europeanization, however, is anything but a simple, linear progression.  It is a 
complicated process that requires accord between many different goals and visions. 
 In examining France’s experience with Europeanization over the past twenty 
years, the complexity and challenges that come along with the process are evident.  
France is a state based on a strong tradition of centralization, and as such, is wary of the 
threat to its sovereignty presented by the European Union.  While France is increasingly 
open to the idea of political integration, especially since the implementation of the 
Maastricht Treaty, it is still skeptical.  Many instances throughout France’s recent past 
exemplify this but perhaps it is most significantly evidenced by the requirement of the 
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new European Union legislation to take the form of a treaty, rather than a constitution.  
While seemingly a simple change in vocabulary, the implications of the ratification of a 
treaty, rather than a constitution, signify continued caution surrounding political 
integration. 
 Because political integration is still a relatively new notion, French political 
leaders are still working to understand how to balance their desire to see an effective 
European Union with their desire to simultaneously retaining a degree of sovereignty.  
This tug-of-war pervades the experience of French political leaders and the general public 
alike with the process of Europeanization.  The French are really trying to have it both 
ways: to benefit from integration on the one hand, while also not compromising étatisme 
and their political identity on the other.  This internal conflict presents a challenge to 
Europeanization in France, as the French are constantly torn between two sets of ideals. 
 A further challenge to the progression of Europeanization in France comes from 
France’s extremely particular idea of the shape that the Europe of the future should take.  
The French envision a Europe that is integrated, but also allows member states to retain 
sovereignty and freedom.  This conception of Europe allows the French to balance their 
European and domestic political ambitions.  Consequently, when European integration 
aligns with this vision of Europe, the French are enthusiastic about its possibilities.  On 
the other hand, when the visions are misaligned, the French become very skeptical of 
Europeanization and reluctant to support the EU’s endeavors.  Though France has seen its 
role in the EU diminish over the past twenty years especially, it still remains influential, 
meaning that when it does not support Europeanization, the process cannot move forward 
 102 
effectively.  However, France does not eternally oppose Europeanization, suggesting that 
Europeanization can in fact progress. 
 The dichotomy in France does help to explain why political integration has not 
progressed to the same extent as economic integration.  While French political leaders 
may be among the more vocal EU members when it comes to their objections that does 
not mean that other states are not faced with similar changes.  Because political 
integration is still a relatively new concept (as compared to economic integration), it is 
only natural that there are questions about the impact that political integration will have 
on the EU, the member states and the relationship between them.  That does not mean, 
however, that political integration is not possible.   
It is important to remember that the tight economic integration that exists today 
did not happen overnight, rather, it was a slow process that took nearly fifty years to 
come to fruition.  Likewise, political unification will not be a quick process either.  If 
both leaders at the European level and the domestic level are patient and open-minded 
however, there is no reason why the EU cannot continue the forward march toward 
political integration.  The most important conclusion that can be drawn based on a study 
of France, political integration, the EU and Europeanization over the past twenty years is 
that political integration is possible, but to reach the same degree of political integration 
as there is currently economic integration will be neither an easy nor a quick 
process…but with time, come possibilities as well. 
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Chapter 5: The Europeanization of Social Sovereignty 
 
Introduction 
 From its inception in the post-World War II period, the European Union and its 
various forms were based heavily on the economic integration of the member states.  
These states cooperated in areas of shared economic interest, where they could be more 
effective acting together, rather than individually.  Over time, as economic integration 
increased, there was a push for the creation of political institutions that could regulate the 
economic activities of the community.  Up until this time, the European Union was 
somewhat abstract and distant, affecting the state and the lives of elites much more 
directly than it did the average citizens of the EU.  However, with the last push for 
greater economic integration, and the political integration that accompanied it, in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, the notion of social integration became relevant in discourse 
surrounding the EU as well. 
 Whereas economic and political integration are relatively clear-cut in their 
processes and goals, social integration is more ambiguous and more complicated.  This 
chapter presumes to understand social integration as the impact of Europeanization on the 
social sovereignty of member states and their citizens.  As a result of social integration, 
the European citizens and states gain a new layer of rights and responsibilities in the 
social realm.  The social extension is meant to break down barriers between the citizens 
of the EU to create cohesion on the most fundamental level.  This integration can then 
reinforce the political and economic integration projects taking place on the national and 
supranational level.  Additionally, the social extension of the European Union and the 
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additional benefits given to member states and citizens as a result, act as a compensation 
for the loss of sovereignty that occurs in the political and economic spheres.  It can also 
be seen as an attempt to provide stability to the shifting socio-economic system in the 
EU.  With economic integration and the transfer of economic authority from the member 
states to the EU, the socio-economic position of the citizens of member states changes as 
well.  Through social integration, the citizens of these member states can better 
understand their position in the EU as it develops.  
While social integration is not meant to be a negative force and a threat to the 
member states, many of them, especially France, see social integration as a threat to their 
social sovereignty.  The notion of social sovereignty can have many different 
interpretations whether approached from a socio-economic viewpoint or based on the 
French model of social identity.  For the purposes of this study, social sovereignty will be 
considered to be synonymous with national identity and the more direct impact on the 
daily lives of French citizens.  The member states worry that their national identity will 
be eroded in favor a collective European identity even though the perceived threat of 
social sovereignty is incredibly intangible.  Social integration cannot physically destroy 
what it means to be French or German or British or Italian and in fact, many of the 
elements espoused by European social policies complement the notions inherent in 
national identity.   
Though the perceived threat to social sovereignty may be unfounded, it is still 
considered substantial by France and other member states.  The French have a very 
particular conception of their national identity, rooted in universalism, cultural 
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superiority, language, culture, and common political identity.  For the French, who are 
incredibly wary of any difference or change to the way they understand themselves, 
Europeanization poses a great threat. Based on these understandings of social integration 
and social sovereignty, the following chapter will study the impact that Europeanization 
is having on French national identity, or nationalism, and the way that the French 
understand themselves and the European Union. 
What impact will Europeanization and the development of a European identity 
have on the French, their identity and their culture?  Is a new European identity replacing 
French identity?  Is the French identity holding staunchly in contrast to the European 
identity?  Or is there the possibility of some sort of middle ground consensus (a Franco-
European identity)?  The answers to these questions will provide important insight into 
the future of the European Union and its relationship to the Frenchman (or citizen of any 
other member state).  Analyzing the French reaction to Europeanization suggests that 
though the French are very proud of their identity, they are accepting of the idea of 
striking a balance between retaining sovereignty and being open to Europeanization.  
Perhaps national identity and European identity can complement, rather than compete 
with, each other. 
 In order to understand the impact that Europeanization has, or has not had, on 
French identity, it is first necessary to explicitly detail what is meant by French identity: 
its roots, its characteristics and its implications for understanding the EU and the world.  
The chapter will then unfold into three main sections.   
- Section 2 will study the Maastricht Treaty and the changes enacted by it, to 
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understand the possible social implications of this initiation of social integration.   
- Section 3 will examine the post-Maastricht period and the way in which France 
began to internalize the changes of the Maastricht Treaty, to understand the way 
in which social changes are reconciled and justified on the national level.   
- Section 4 will revisit the study of Europeanization in the new millennium, briefly 
touching on the failed ratification of the EU Constitution before delving into an 
examination of the Treaty of Lisbon.  The goal of this section will be to 
understand whether and to what degree there has been any progress in the realm 
of social sovereignty.   
The observations from these three body sections will be brought together and 
analyzed in the conclusion, which will address the broader implications of France’s 
experience with the social aspects of Europeanization. 
 
French National Identity 
 The conception of French national identity held by French citizens today is rooted 
in the French Revolution and the year 1789.  The French Revolution, in fact, gave birth to 
the French nation and its accompanying notions of nationalism and national identity.
1
  
Out of the Revolution was created: 
A nation une et indivisible, composed of legally equal individuals standing in a 
direct relationship to the state, out of a patchwork of overlapping corporate 
jurisdictions and pervasive corporate privilege; and of the substitution of a 
militant, mobilized nationalism for the cosmopolitanism, the prevailing 
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indifference to nationality and citizenship, of the old regime”
2
 
 
This single statement provides many important insights into the way the French 
understand their identity and how that identity shapes how the French understand their 
world.  
 First and foremost, French national identity is based on allegiance to the French 
state, above all else.  In the wake of the French revolution, membership in any sort of 
sub-national group was abolished, forcing the citizen to turn to the French state for 
protection.
3
  In France, even today, the state remains paramount and the social and 
cultural aspects of national identity are closely linked with the political structure of the 
state.  The complexity of French identity helps to explain why the French are so eager to 
guard it.  A change in identity does not just affect the average citizen, but also has 
political and economic implications. 
 Furthermore, the allegiance to the French state emphasized by national identity 
has an important exclusionary element as well.  By creating the nation and the nation-
state, the French Revolution also created a sharp divide between those who are French 
and those who are not.  As Brubaker explains: 
The Revolutionary invention of the nation-state and national citizenship thus 
engendered the modern figure of the foreigner – not only as legal category but a 
political epithet, invested with a psychopolitical charge it formerly lacked and 
condensing around itself purse outsiderhood.
4
 
 
This notion of exclusion via ‘outsiderhood’ has characterized French identity for the past 
200 years and still remains a very real element of French identity today.  The outsider is 
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seen as a threat to what it means to be French and consequently, being French comes with 
a sense of culture superiority and universalism.  In France, there is one French culture, 
one French state, and one French identity.  Multiculturalism and the hyphenated identities 
of the United States do not exist.
5
 
 French identity pervades all aspects of life in France: political, cultural, economic, 
religious.  The French are incredibly proud of what it means to be French.  But this pride 
is also accompanied by stubbornness and fear.  Because French identity pervades so 
many different aspects of life, a threat to French identity in one sphere is perceived as 
having a ripple effect for the French nation and the French state as well.  Threats to 
French identity come in many different forms, but the most pertinent for this study is the 
threat posed by the European Union.  The French view the European Union in very much 
the same way that they view the immigrants in their country.  Both the EU and the 
immigrants propose to integrate “un-French elements” into French identity, ultimately 
changing the French nation.   
 While the threat posed by the EU could be ignored when the EU existed as an 
overarching but somewhat ineffective supranational actor, as legislation such as the 
Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon come into effect, the threat posed by the EU 
to French identity becomes much more tangible.  The strengthening of economic and 
political integration makes the threat of social integration a reality.  This chapter will 
analyze how France is coping with and reacting to the threat that Europeanization is 
posing to French national identity.  Can the French balance protecting their national 
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identity with being open to the possibilities afforded them through social integration?  
The answer to this question will be explored throughout the following sections of this 
chapter by analyzing the French reaction to the changes proposed Maastricht Treaty and 
the Treaty of Lisbon.  Examining these changes and the French reaction will enable 
conclusions to be drawn about the future relationship between European and national 
identity. 
 
Starting Social Integration: The Maastricht Treaty 
The Basics of Maastricht 
 In the previous chapter, the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) was 
analyzed from a political perspective to understand the interaction between 
Europeanization and the state.  In this chapter, the study of the Maastricht Treaty will be 
approached from the social perspective, in order to examine the impact of 
Europeanization on the nation.  Though the impact of the Maastricht Treaty, which 
entered into force on November 1, 1993, was more significant in the political and 
economic realms, it did have an impact in the social realm as well.
6
 
 In fact, it was precisely the political and economic changes that enabled the 
framers of the Maastricht Treaty to envision the possibility of social integration.  The 
economic cooperation that existed in the European Union prior to the Maastricht Treaty 
provided the impetus for the political integration, through the strengthening of EU 
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institutions that resulted from the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.  The further 
political and economic integration gave a greater role to the EU and enabled the 
expansion of its reach into the social realm as well.
7
  As political institutions were 
developed and strengthened to regulate economic integration, the visibility of the EU 
increased and citizens of member states began to associate more closely with it.  Though 
extensive social integration was not a direct result of the Maastricht Treaty, it laid the 
foundations that would enable social issues to be considered further in future EU 
legislation. 
 Of the five goals that were outlined for the Maastricht Treaty, one was relevant in 
the social realm, to “develop the Community social dimension.”
8
  This objective is 
necessarily vague.  As Maastricht was the first foray into the social realm of integration, 
there was no evidence about how the member states or their citizens would react to the 
possibility of forming a closer social community.  However, emphasizing integration 
beyond the economic and political realm suggests that EU policymakers believed that for 
the EU to be more effective, it would need to touch the lives of EU citizens in other areas 
as well.  Working toward the goal of a ‘social dimension’ would complement integration 
of the economic and political spheres. 
 In order to achieve this goal, several elements were put in place in the Maastricht 
Treaty, most notably the social protocol and the delineation of EU citizenship.  These two 
new additions above and beyond economic and political integration provide an increased 
role for the European Union in the lives of the citizens of member states, now referred to 
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as EU citizens.
9
  In these ways, the Maastricht Treaty symbolized the extension of the EU 
into a new realm.  Whereas political elements were aimed at strengthening the EU, the 
social elements were aimed at touching the daily lives of the average EU citizens. 
 However, in France in particular, where the notion of citizenship and the rights of 
people are so closely linked with identity, the social aspects of the Maastricht Treaty sent 
shockwaves through the French political elite and public alike.  Just as the French were 
coming to terms with the requirements of increased economic integration under the 
Single European Act and contemplating the future relationship between the state and the 
EU after political integration, their social sovereignty and national identity were called 
into question as well.  The changes that Maastricht would bring about on the European 
level would cause the French to reexamine their understanding of what it means to be a 
French citizen and a citizen of the European Union. 
 
Changes Brought About by Maastricht  
 The impact of the Maastricht Treaty in the social realm was less extensive than in 
the economic or political realm.  However, despite a more restricted scope and limited 
legislation to be studied, there are two very important additions to the Maastricht Treaty 
that can provide insight into the process of Europeanization and the future of social 
integration.  The social changes that Maastricht enacted can be best understood by 
examining the elements of the social protocol as well as analyzing the social implications 
of the creation of European citizenship. 
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 The Protocol on Social Policy is made up of seven articles that address different 
areas considered to be of social importance in the European Union.
10
  Six of the articles 
elaborate the areas where the social elements of Maastricht are expected to have an 
impact:  
Promotion of employment…improvement of living and working 
conditions…adequate social protection…social dialogue…the development of 
human resources to ensure a high and sustainable level of employment…the 
integration of persons excluded from the labour market.
11
 
 
The inclusion of these social elements in the Maastricht Treaty makes the EU a much 
more tangible entity for the average citizen of the EU.  Now, the EU takes responsibility 
for ensuring that certain conditions are met in each of the relevant areas of social policy.  
However, the inclusion of these conditions also blurs the line of competence and 
responsibility between the EU and the member states.  All of these areas are ones in 
which the state is generally considered to be responsible for ensuring compliance and the 
protection and well being of citizens. 
 Thus, the extension of the Protocol on Social Policy suggests two possibilities 
about the nation-state in the Maastricht era: 1) the state is no longer adequately upholding 
its responsibilities to its citizens or 2) the state is no longer effective in these areas 
because of the increased role of the EU.  In essence, the two possibilities are closely 
linked.  Because the EU is introducing a new system of governance and control, as well 
as changing the relationship between the member states, there are times when the 
member state may be unable or unaware of how to act on behalf of its citizens.  The 
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policy makers in the EU recognize that a shifting understanding of the international 
system requires a shift in sovereignty as well. 
 As such, the incorporation of the Protocol on Social Policy takes away a degree of 
sovereignty and control from the member states.  As Maastricht essentially explains, the 
EU is more capable of acting in these policy areas.
12
  If the EU is now responsible for 
protecting the French citizens in these areas, what does this mean for the French state?  If 
French citizens are supposed to be above all allegiant to the French state, how can they 
reconcile this with the presence of the EU in their lives?  The EU is not a part of French 
citizenship or French national identity, yet can still play an important role in the lives of 
French citizens. 
 The incorporation of social elements into European legislation requires a delicate 
balancing act with the interests of the member states.  The Maastricht Treaty does 
provide for recognition of the continued importance of the member states.  In pursuit of a 
social dimension of the EU, “the Community and the Member States shall implement 
measures which take account of the diverse forms of national practices.”
13
  For states 
such as France that worry about becoming “too European”, this is a necessary 
qualification that, to a degree, ensures that they can expect to maintain some sort of 
control. Another important qualification included in the Maastricht Treaty explains that 
“the provisions adopted pursuant to this Article [1] shall not prevent any Member State 
from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures compatible with the 
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Treaty.”
14
  Thus, within the conditions of the Protocol on Social Policy, the member 
states have a degree of freedom in how they meet the conditions, so long as they adhere 
to the minimum guidelines established by the EU.   
 Furthermore, Maastricht provides for the gradual implementation of the directives 
that will establish the conditions outlined under the social protocol.  Though every year 
the Commission will report on the progress towards achieving the objectives laid out in 
Article 1, there are no specific benchmark levels of progress that much be reached.
15
  In 
this way, the Maastricht Treaty is not rushing the implementation of the social elements, 
but is only requiring that there be some sort of progress. Furthermore, it is not explicitly 
written in the Treaty how many of the objectives must be achieved, leaving the states to 
enact the measures they deem to be best or most effective for their specific situations.
16
  
In essence, the Maastricht Treaty says, “you need to do this, but we won’t tell you how”, 
allowing states to retain a degree of autonomy while still working toward common goals.  
For a state like France that is wary of being told to do things differently, this approach 
allows for a combination of achieving EU goals while still retaining sovereignty.  France 
can then justify supporting social integration because it can do so on its own terms.  
Allowing for pursuit of common goals through state specific means will enable each state 
to come to terms individually with Europeanization, which in turn will contribute more 
effectively to social integration. 
 The creation of European citizenship is also an important step in the process of 
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European social integration.  As the idea of European citizenship spans both the political 
and social realm, it illustrates the interconnectedness of the two spheres and the 
importance of the relationship between the two for the progress of Europeanization.  The 
Maastricht Treaty outlines four rights afforded to European citizens: 
The right to circulate and reside freely in the Community…the right to vote and to 
stand as a candidate for European and municipal elections in the State in which he 
or she resides…the right to protection by diplomatic or consular authorities of a 
Member State other than the citizen’s Member State of origin on the territory of a 
third country in which the state of origin is not represented…the right to petition 
the European Parliament and to submit a complaint to the Ombudsman.
17
  
 
The very creation of the notion of EU citizenship and the rights of citizens that should be 
protected by the EU suggests that the member state is no longer capable of fully 
protecting its citizens. 
 According to EU citizenship, citizens of member states are also now considered to 
be citizens of the European Union.
18
  This idea, essentially of dual citizenship, is 
inherently incompatible with what it means to be French.  French national identity and 
nationalism are based on an alliance to the French state above all else.  Accordingly, 
there is no body, entity or organization greater than that French state, so EU citizenship 
cannot be considered superior to French citizenship.
19
  Thus, EU citizenship would in 
theory fall into the subnational organization category.  However, France does not allow 
for allegiance to subnational organizations either.  How, then, can a French citizen be a 
European citizen as well?   
 The creation of EU citizenship suggests the possibility of a hyphenated Franco-
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European identity, which according to the tenets of French identity simply cannot hold 
true.  Furthermore, by allowing for the free movement of EU citizens, the lines of identity 
are further blurred.  Now, citizens of other member states can move to France to seek 
employment, bringing with them their own identity, nationalism and culture.
20
  The 
French perceive this inundation of new cultures into France as a significant threat to their 
social sovereignty.  Not only is their identity being challenged from the supranational 
EU, it is also being challenged from below, by EU citizens themselves. 
 Furthermore, the clause on European citizenship is not finite as is.  In the last line 
of the section there is a provision allowing for: 
The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament, may adopt provisions to strengthen or add to 
the rights laid down in this Part, which it shall recommend to the Member States 
for adoption in accordance with their respective requirements.
21
 
 
The French do not even have control over what conditions can be added to the list of 
benefits of being a European Union citizenship.  This uncertainty is especially terrifying 
to the French.  What if citizens, especially from the newer, less “European” member 
states, decide to move to France and run for election under the conditions of EU 
citizenship?  How can this be reconciled with the French nation and nationalism? 
 Both the implementation of the Protocol on Social Policy and the creation of 
European citizenship have important implications for the future of social integration and 
the understanding of French national identity.  They suggest that perhaps in light of the 
changes in the international system and the increasing political and economic strength of 
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the European Union, there are certain areas in which the European Union is a more 
effective actor.  The foundations laid by the Maastricht Treaty are responsible for 
initiating the process of social integration.  However, the true impetus for integration 
must come from the member states themselves, through the domestic realization of 
European policies.  Understanding the way in which legislation surrounding social 
integration is internalized will provide further insight into the social impact of 
Europeanization. 
 
A Social Shift? The Domestic Impact of Maastricht 
 With an established understanding of the social elements and implications of the 
Maastricht Treaty, the study of the relationship between Europeanization, social 
integration, and France can be expanded, to analyze the domestic impact that the 
Maastricht Treaty had in France.  This section will approach this impact from three 
different perspectives, by examining the deliberations of the French Constitutional 
Council, the reaction on the part of political elites, as well as how the French public came 
to understand the social aspects of Europeanization.   
 The social implications of the Maastricht Treaty have a much more direct impact 
on the lives of French citizens than do political or economic changes, due in large part to 
the way that French national identity is integrated into both economic and political life.  
While political and economic life can exist independently from French identity, political 
and social elements are inextricably bound up in the notion of what it means to French.  
A change in French identity likely has political and/or economic repercussions as well.  
 118 
The social implications of Europeanization then, are particularly important to understand 
because they could extend into the economic and political spheres as well. 
 One of the most significant domestic impacts of the Maastricht Treaty is the way 
in which it has caused the French to reconsider how they view and understand themselves 
in the global community.  Thus, an analysis of public opinion becomes extremely 
relevant in understanding the domestic impact of the Protocol on Social Policy and the 
establishment of European citizenship.  The Protocol on Social Policy and European 
citizenship do not just impact public opinion, however, so it will be necessary to examine 
their impact more broadly, looking at changes to the French Constitution as well as the 
overall reaction to social integration.  The broad impact of the social changes then poses 
an interesting question: was the reaction to Europeanization and the social aspects of 
Maastricht the same from political elites and the general population?  Were both opposed 
to a new conception of French identity or was one group more open to changes than the 
other?  The answers to these questions, which will come from the analysis of the 
aforementioned areas, can provide important insights into the driving forces behind 
Europeanization as well as the roots of opposition to integration. 
 An analysis of the deliberations of the French Constitutional Council on the 
Maastricht Treaty, both from April 7-9, 1992 and September 2, 1992, indicates that the 
social impact of Maastricht was much less extensive than its political impact.  During the 
first meeting of the French Constitutional Council, Maastricht 1, though several changes 
were deemed necessary to the French Constitution, only two fell into the social realm.  
First, as addressed in the previous chapter, the issue of European citizenship and the right 
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of foreigners to vote and run for office in national elections was one that was considered 
heavily by the Constitutional Council.
22
  In addition, the Constitutional Council 
addressed the right of European citizens as pertains to “the entry and movement of 
persons.”
23
  Though several articles in the Maastricht Treaty pertain to this right, only 
Article 100c(3) raised the concerns of the Constitutional Council.  This Article deals with 
situations in which the European Council can act with relation to upholding the free 
movement of people.
24
  The Constitutional Council however, determined that: 
The abandonment of the unanimity rule as provided by Article 100c(3) could, in 
spite of Article 100c(4) and (5) generate a situation in which the exercise of 
national sovereignty was jeopardized…[because]…international agreements 
entered into by the authorities of the French Republic may not adversely affect the 
exercise by the State of the powers that are at the core of its national 
sovereignty.
25
   
 
Article 100c(3) eliminates the ability of the French state to make determinations 
about who can and cannot enter the French state and consequently, has the potential to 
compromise their national identity.  If non-nationals inundate the French state, there is 
the potential for French national identity to be diluted.  As such, the Maastricht Treaty 
could not be ratified until the issues raised with the two elements of European citizenship 
were addressed. 
 Despite concerns about the threat posed to French national identity and 
sovereignty by the social elements of the Maastricht Treaty, when the findings of the 
Constitutional Council were presented, the appropriate changes were made to the French 
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Constitution so that the Maastricht Treaty could be ratified.
26
  This suggests that the 
French political elites realized that the benefits that would be gained through the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, most notably in the economic and political realm, 
would outweigh the potential threat to their identity.   
 A second meeting of the Constitutional Council, Maastricht 2, took place on 
September 2, 1992, after the appropriate changes were made to the French Constitution 
on June 25, 1992.
27
  At this meeting, the changed Constitution was analyzed alongside 
the Maastricht Treaty to ensure that there were no longer any discrepancies.  European 
citizenship was addressed through the addition of a new section to the French 
Constitution, Article 88-3, which dealt explicitly with the restriction of the rights of non-
nationals to vote and stand for elections in France.  This amendment rectified the 
discrepancy as it pertained to that aspect of European citizenship.
28
  Addressing the 
constitutionality of Article 100c(3) proved to be much more complicated however.  The 
challenges posed to Article 100c(3) likely stem from the xenophobia inherent in French 
culture.  The allowance of free entry and movement of people throughout the European 
Union would be one of a xenophobic Frenchman’s worst fears.  Now non-nationals 
throughout the EU can enter France with much more limited restrictions.   
When the revised Constitution was brought to the attention of the Constitutional 
Council, arguments were raised stating that the appropriate changes had not been made to 
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the Constitution, meaning that Maastricht could not be ratified.
29
  However, the 
Constitutional Council ruled that Article 88-2 of the French Constitution: 
Remove[s] constitutional barriers identified by the Constitutional Council in its 
decision of 9 April 1992 in the particular field to which it relates; the constituent 
power is sovereign, save only for the exceptions indicated above; it has power to 
repeal, amend, and amplify constitutional provisions in such manner as it sees fit; 
the argument by the authors of the referral that the constitution and the Treaty are 
incompatible is thus devoid of substance.
30
 
 
This explanation by the Constitutional Council suggests that though Article 100c(3) of 
the Maastricht Treaty may have been unconstitutional when it was created, the French 
Constitution has been adjusted so that there is no longer a conflict.  Furthermore, there is 
an indication that the French state is giving up sovereignty in certain policy areas, but 
overall, is retaining its sovereignty and its power to protect the French citizens and the 
French national identity.  Given that the French are so jealous of their national identity 
and so wary of threats to it, this willingness to accept a lesser degree of sovereignty that 
may open French identity to the possibility of change is quite surprising.  It suggests that 
the French perceive a benefit to Europeanization that outweighs the loss of sovereignty 
and control over national identity that accompany it. 
 This cautious optimism about Europeanization is echoed in the general reaction to 
the social aspects of integration as expressed through the Maastricht Treaty.  This is not 
to suggest, however, that social integration was welcomed with open arms, as it certainly 
was not.  The social aspects of Europeanization elicited both support and skepticism from 
the French political elite, which is to be expected.  Because characteristics of 
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Europeanization run counter to many of the elements on which French identity is based, 
in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty, “national traditions…reasserted themselves strongly 
in the form of strategies for resisting change, and in the details of implementation.”
31
  
These national traditions proved to be quite powerful and resilient to Europeanization.  
Though the Maastricht Treaty may have begun to open French identity to the possibility 
of change, “contemporary France…remains a mixture of fascinating tendencies and 
contradictions.”
32
 
 It is these contradictions that have for so long characterized French 
exceptionalism that help explain the French reaction to Europeanization.  France’s hot 
and cold approach to Europeanization is just another in a long line of French peculiarities 
and anomalies.  Thus, social integration can be successful in France, so long as it is 
reconciled with French identity.  This is exactly what François Mitterrand, President of 
the French Republic at the time of the Maastricht Treaty hoped to do, as he attempted to 
“construct a new vision of France and Europe which conjoined the future of the French 
nation with that of European integration.”
33
  Europeanization could be seen as a way for 
the French to protect themselves and their identity against the greater threat of 
globalization.  By opening themselves to Europe, the French could put an extra layer of 
protection between themselves and the rest of the world.   
 One of the most significant impacts of the Maastricht Treaty, not only in the 
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social realm, was that it increased the visibility of the European Union.  The policies of 
the Maastricht Treaty that provided for greater political effectiveness also enabled the 
citizens of member states to understand the ways in which the European Union could be 
relevant in their daily lives.  However, an increased awareness of the role of the EU also 
draws attention to what the EU is unable to do.  Though the EU may have a new role on 
the lives of citizens, the French state:  
Still performs three important functions…first, it is the advocate of national 
interests within European and international institutions; second, it implements 
policies designed to improve the environment of firms to promote the creation of 
added value on French territory; and third, it is the ultimate protector national 
capital.
34
 
 
 Because of the links between French national identity and the economic and 
political spheres, it is important not to discount the role that the French state still plays in 
political and economic activity.  The Maastricht Treaty has ushered in a new era of 
partnership between the nation-state and the European Union.  The two do not need to be 
mutually exclusive and in fact, can be complementary.  As Mitterrand explained, “France 
is our fatherland, Europe is our future.”
35
  Acknowledging the opportunities afforded to 
France by the European Union does not discount the value of French national identity or 
culture, but rather, suggests another level of protection and perpetuation for Frenchness.   
 If French political elites recognize the way in which Europeanization can be 
leveraged for the benefit of, rather than at the cost of, French national identity, then the 
push for further integration will be more successful.  Over the past 200 years, French 
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identity has been far from constant.  It has been changed and molded throughout time to 
reflect the interests of political elites.
36
  Europeanization provides yet another opportunity 
for such a reformation of French identity.  The evolution of French identity over time has 
not changed the inherent meaning behind Frenchness, but rather, has justified the 
perpetuation of French identity in light of the current social, political, and economic 
context.  Today is no different; “political elites can legitimately promote any European 
idea which resonates with French exceptionalism and does not violate the particular 
concept of Republicanism, including a Europeanization of French exceptionalism.”
37
  As 
the European Union develops its own social dimension, advocating certain social values 
and norms, it will be much easier for political elites to create a discourse that integrates 
Europeanization with the traditions of the French nation and nationalism. 
 The discourse of political elites is thus very important for predicting the future of 
Europeanization, especially when coupled with the uncertainty surrounding the 
perception of social integration as exhibited by the French.  The inconsistent survey 
results indicate that the French are unsure about the impact that Europeanization is 
having and will have on their identity.
38
  The uncertainty exhibited by the French public 
is a result of two contributing factors: first, social integration was an incredibly new 
concept at the time of the Maastricht Treaty and second, there is no consistent discourse 
expressed by political elites.  The French public does not have a standard on which they 
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can base their opinions and understanding of what Europeanization means for them in the 
future. 
 However, the fact that the French public has not taken a position staunchly in 
opposition to the social aspects of Europeanization suggests once again that there is a 
possibility of reconciling French national identity with Europeanization.  In fact, in 1992, 
more than half of the French population perceived themselves as both French and 
European at the same time.
39
  Interestingly, however, between 1991 and 1992, the 
percentage of the population who thought of themselves as often or sometimes European 
fell from 68% to 52% while the percent of people who said that they never feel European 
increased from 32% to 47%.
40
  This is likely a reflection of the conflicting discourse that 
emerged as a result of the Maastricht Treaty referendum.  As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, there was no consistent left/right split over Maastricht and the population divided 
almost evenly in favor of and in opposition to the Maastricht Treaty.
41
 
 Regardless of the uncertainty about what exactly the social aspects of 
Europeanization mean for them, more than half of the French population between 1991 
and 1993 believed that the social dimension of the single market was beneficial.  With the 
exception of a single poll in 1991, the percentage was upwards of 60% for the entire 
period.
42
  Furthermore, in 1992, 66% of the French people believed that in the future, 
national and European identity would coexist.  This portion of the population is 4% 
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higher than the average throughout the other 12 EU member states, suggesting that 
perhaps French national identity and European identity are not as incompatible in 
actuality as they are in theory.
43
 
 The overall domestic reaction in France to Europeanization suggests that social 
integration and French national identity are not inherently incompatible.  In fact, there 
seems to be an optimistic curiosity about what Europeanization will mean for the French 
nation, national identity and nationals.  This belief has stemmed from the failure of the 
French political elites to espouse a single discourse pertaining to the social aspects of 
Europeanization.  Thus, the general population has been given a rare opportunity in 
France, where so much is directed by the state, to form an opinion independent of the 
direction of political elites.  Despite this freedom, the general population, much like the 
political elite, has been unable to form a consistent opinion of Europeanization. 
 This trend of inconsistency is reflected throughout the study of the domestic 
impact of social integration.  Due in large part to the limited knowledge of what social 
integration means both domestically and for the European Union, there is a hesitancy to 
accept it with open arms.  However, it is promising that in the country that is considered 
to be most jealous of its social sovereignty, there has been a degree of openness and 
acceptance of the possibility of social integration, even if to a limited extent. 
 The true test of the possibility of integrating French social sovereignty with the 
dominant conception of Europeanization will be seeing whether or not the social 
optimism characteristic of the post-Maastricht period will continue into the future.  
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Presumably, as the European Union marches towards further economic and political 
integration, social integration will follow.  However, if the elites in France fail to develop 
a coherent discourse surrounding social integration, the uncertainty of the general 
population could effectively stall the progression of the social aspects of Europeanization.  
As such, studying the progress of the social aspects of Europeanization over time will 
provide crucial evidence about the potential of further social integration. 
 
Towards a New Social Understanding: The EU Constitution and Lisbon 
 
The European Constitution: A Pause in Europeanization 
 
 Throughout the 1990s, the European Union and its member states continued the 
slow march of social integration.  The Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice built upon the 
foundations that the Maastricht Treaty had established in the social realm.
44
  After the 
ratification of the Treaty of Nice, the European member states decided that the complex 
legislature of the EU needed to be simplified and that there should be a push for greater 
integration.  In October 2004, the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (EU 
Constitution) was signed, as the embodiment of the desire for closer political and social 
integration specifically.
45
   
 The Preamble of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe “invokes the 
desire of the peoples of Europe to transcend their ancient divisions in order to forge a 
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common destiny, while remaining proud of their national identities and history.”
46
  As a 
Constitution, rather than simply a treaty, the document would have a further, deeper 
reach, more directly touching the lives of French citizens, and those of citizens in other 
member states as well.  The EU Constitution provided for the further extension of social 
integration specifically, through the addition and amendment of several areas of the 
Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties including: fundamental rights, EU citizenship 
and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union.
47
 
 Upon examination of the EU Constitution, the French Parliament determined that 
the combination of social, political and economic changes proposed by it were too 
extensive and posed a threat to French sovereignty. The failed ratification vote in France, 
then, was not motivated simply by the political factors stated in the previous chapter, but 
had social motivations as well.  In fact, the failure of the EU Constitution was driven by 
the French fear of the ‘other’ and what the implications would be for French identity, if it 
were to become more open to Europeanization.
48
  The ratification of the EU Constitution 
reintroduced the debates surrounding Europeanization that had been prevalent during the 
Maastricht referendum, which became critical contributions to the possibility of ratifying 
the EU Constitution:  
One shouldn’t undermine the contribution to the overall total of the No vote by 
the Eurosceptic xenophobic withdrawal embodied by right-wing conservative 
MPF or the extreme-right…undoubtedly the national sovereignty camp regained 
momentum during the whole time of the campaign and eventually took a 
significant part in delivering the fatal sword thrust to the European constitutional 
                                                
46
 Europa, “Uniting Europe Step By Step – The Treaties: A Constitution for Europe,” 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/constitution/introduction_en.htm. 
47
 Europa, “Uniting Europe Step By Step – The Treaties: A Constitution for Europe.”  
48
 Gilles Ivaldi, “Beyond France’s 2005 referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty,”  West 
European Politics 29, no. 1 (January 2006): 47-69. 
 129 
Treaty.
49
 
 
Though in the post-Maastricht period, the French had appeared able to reconcile their 
views of national identity with the prospects of Europeanization, the debates surrounding 
the EU Constitution suggest otherwise.  Nationalism and national sovereignty played a 
key role in motivating the French to voice their discontent with the progress and 
prospects of Europeanization.
50
 
The opposition to the EU Constitution was “a retrospective vote on the process of 
European integration itself.”
51
  Though the French had been cautiously optimistic about 
the future of social integration when the Maastricht Treaty was ratified, the EU 
Constitution gave them an opportunity to react to the experience of integration that they 
had had over the past ten years.  Though political issues were important in motivating the 
French rejection of the EU Constitution, “the most significant element in the rejection of 
the European constitution was the retrospective performance evaluation vote on the EU 
model of social and economic governance.”
52
  Thus, the French non was a reaction to the 
idea that the Europe the French had been promised in 1992, that aligned with their views 
of what Europe should be, did not materialize to the extent that they had hoped that it 
would.   
This non, and the no from the Netherlands as well, sent shockwaves through the 
EU and the member states.  The grand project that was supposed to provide for the closer 
integration of the member states was now stopped in its tracks.  What would this mean 
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for the future of Europeanization?  The EU and its member states took the failed 
ratification of the EU Constitution as an opportunity to reflect on this question and 
reevaluate the direction that the EU should take in the future.  After the period of 
reflection, the ambitions of the EU and integration were scaled back and presented in the 
form of the Treaty of Lisbon.  Though the Treaty of Lisbon contained many of the same 
elements as the EU Constitution, especially in the social realm, the hope was that the new 
approach would allow for them to be realized, despite opposition.
53
  
 
A Social Understanding of the Treaty of Lisbon 
 While the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on December 13, 2007, is essentially a 
fallback plan of Europeanization and concession to the opponents of European 
integration, it can still be seen as an indicator of the progression of the social aspects of 
Europeanization.  In essence, the Treaty of Lisbon was a toned down, scaled back version 
of the EU Constitution, that did not have as broad an impact, but still attempted to 
achieve the goal of further, closer social integration of the member states.
54
   
 Of the major objectives outlined for the Treaty of Lisbon, one is particularly 
relevant to a study of social sovereignty.  In the social realm, the Treaty of Lisbon aimed 
at creating:  
A Europe of rights and values, freedom, solidarity and security, promoting the 
Union’s values, introducing the Charter of Fundamental Rights into European 
primary law, providing for new solidarity mechanisms and ensuring better 
protection of European citizens.
55
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The Treaty of Lisbon was architected to allow for a closer integration of the citizens of 
the member states and to increase their allegiance to the EU through the emphasis on 
values and rights.  In this way, the Treaty of Lisbon was the most extensive document of 
social integration to date, enacting more changes than Maastricht. 
 The emphasis of the Treaty of Lisbon was on both reinforcing the democratic 
values that form the foundation of the European Union and expanding the rights and 
privileges of EU citizens through the enforcement the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
56
  
The objective of the European Union becomes promoting the core values of the EU: 
“human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and the respect for human 
rights…common to all Member States.”
57
  Whereas the Maastricht Treaty merely 
mentioned the desire to create a social dimension of the EU, the Treaty of Lisbon enables 
the social dimension to grow and develop.   
 However, the Treaty of Lisbon also puts in place certain checks on the extension 
of the social dimension of the EU to prevent sacrificing the integrity of the member 
states.  Throughout the text of the Treaty, as well as the plain language explanatory 
documents for EU citizens, there is an emphasis on creating a balance between the EU 
and the member states in the social sphere.
58
  Within the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
the delicacy of the relationship between the EU and member states is elaborated: 
The Union contributes to the preservation and to the development of these 
common values while respecting the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the 
peoples of Europe as well as the national identities of the Member States and the 
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organization of their public authorities at national, regional, and local levels; it 
seeks to promote balanced and sustainable development and ensures free 
movement of persons, services, goods and capital, and the freedom of 
establishment.
59
 
 
Contained within this passage is recognition of the value of social integration for the 
progress of Europeanization, but simultaneously, an acknowledgement of the continued 
relevance of the member state.  Europeanization cannot do away with the nation-state in 
one fell swoop.  Rather, it is necessary to gradually integrate the nation, the state and the 
European Union to ensure that the process of Europeanization is relatively smooth. 
 The Charter of Fundamental Rights is one of the most significant elements of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, as it is critical to the transition process between the nation-state and the 
supranational EU.  The Charter is essentially a declaration of rights for the EU citizens.  
Through its six titles: dignity, freedom, equality, solidarity, citizenship, and justice, the 
Charter elaborates the rights and responsibilities of the EU citizen, making them 
accountable to the EU, but also forcing the EU to look after them.  The Charter gives the 
EU both power and relevance in the social realm.  When a member state is unable or 
unwilling to act on behalf of its citizens, the EU can intervene under these guidelines.
60
  
The Charter of Fundamental Rights does not supersede the various declarations of rights 
that exist in the different member states or through international agreements, but is meant 
to be a corollary to those forms of protection. 
 The social changes enacted by the Treaty of Lisbon are aimed at increasing the 
relevance that the EU has in the daily lives of its citizens.  These citizens are no longer 
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just citizens on their state, but are citizens of the European community as well.  As such, 
they owe a degree of allegiance to Europe, but Europe has a responsibility to ensure their 
protection and well being as well.  The more extensive social role of the EU established 
by the Treaty of Lisbon should be a continuation of the process of social Europeanization 
that began with the Maastricht Treaty and continued throughout the 1990s.  However, as 
shown in the last section, the French reaction to Europeanization is not always what one 
would expect.  Thus, in order to develop a more thorough analysis of the progression of 
Europeanization, it is necessary to examine the domestic impact and reaction to the 
Treaty of Lisbon in France.     
 
The Domestic Impact of Lisbon 
 Though the Treaty of Lisbon addressed more areas of social integration than the 
Maastricht Treaty, because the Treaty was so recently put into action, less than six 
months ago, the full extent of the domestic impact has yet to be seen.  However, an 
examination of the deliberations of the French Constitutional Council, as well as analysis 
of elite discourse surrounding social integration and public opinion, can lend insight into 
preliminary conclusions about the further impact of Europeanization on social 
sovereignty.  Despite the limited amount of evidence, what is available suggests that the 
foundations of social integration established by the Maastricht Treaty were built upon by 
the Treaty of Lisbon to further the social aspects of Europeanization. 
 The deliberations of the French Constitutional Council addressing the 
constitutionality of the Treaty of Lisbon took place on December 20, 2007, not long after 
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the Treaty of Lisbon had been signed.  Perhaps speaking to an increased acceptance of 
the social aspects of Europeanization, the Constitutional Council found no 
inconsistencies between the Treaty of Lisbon and the French Constitution.
61
  However, 
this also alludes to the limited scope of the Treaty of Lisbon.  Throughout the Treaty, 
many clauses were included that emphasized that the rights provided for the EU in the 
Treaty are meant to complement, rather than replace, those provided for by the member 
states.  The Constitutional Council noted this, stating in their analysis of the Charter on 
Fundamental Rights that it “does not require any revision of the Constitution, either as 
regards the contents of the Articles thereof or the effects of said Charter on the exercising 
of National Sovereignty.”
62
  As a result of the discontent surrounding the EU 
Constitution, the authors of the Treaty of Lisbon had to be cautious to balance their 
ambitions with the skepticism of the member states, especially France.   
 Though social integration had been a topic of discussion for nearly fifteen years 
by the time the Treaty of Lisbon was put up for ratification, there was still a degree of 
uncertainty surrounding it.  The partitioning of political or economic powers is much 
more clear-cut than is the sharing and splitting of powers in the social realm.  Though 
social sovereignty is defined as national identity, national identity is still a nebulous 
notion, rooted in many feelings and emotions, rather than represented through concrete 
legislation or institutions.  Because national identity means many different things to many 
different countries, European legislation, such as the Treaty of Lisbon, must be 
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acceptable to those who have the strictest understanding of their national identity.  Thus, 
the Treaty of Lisbon attempted to balance the need for the progression of 
Europeanization with the assurance that member states would continue to retain a degree 
of sovereignty. 
 Many of the French political elites shared the same awareness of the importance 
of this balance, recognizing that the future of France was slowly becoming intertwined 
with that of Europe.  Consequently, the elite discourse that was absent during the 
Maastricht and post-Maastricht eras began to evolve around the Treaty of Lisbon.  Even 
leaders, such as Vincent Peillon, who had voted no to the EU Constitution, supported the 
ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, acknowledging that it would provide benefits to 
France in the future.
63
  Much as the previous chapter illustrated with regard to support for 
political integration, the French were willing to support social integration, so long as they 
saw it as advancing their own goals for the future. 
 Bernard Kouchner, the French Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, 
explained that the Treaty of Lisbon, “deserves to be appreciated for its value: as an 
important moment in the construction of the European ideal.”
64
  Once again, there is an 
emphasis on the importance of the Treaty of Lisbon in leading to social cohesion among 
the EU citizens.  Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the French Republic, echoed this 
sentiment when he spoke after the passage of the bill authorizing the ratification of the 
Treaty: 
France’s future and Europe’s destiny are linked…disunited, Europe’s peoples 
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would be incapable of taking up the challenges of the twenty-first 
century…united, they constitute a tremendous political, economic, cultural, and 
moral power which will have its say in world affairs.
65
  
 
In this statement, Sarkozy alludes to an important element of social integration: its ability 
to enable further political and economic integration.  As the citizens of member states see 
themselves increasingly as citizens of Europe, they come to see how the EU and 
integration can benefit them. 
 For this reason, Europeanization must progress cautiously.  If citizens believe that 
Europeanization is beneficial, then they will be likely to support it.  However, if they feel 
that they are being threatened by social integration then they will likely resist changes 
that it hopes to bring about.  Sarkozy cautions EU leaders that:  
Europe must ensure that it is not perceive as a threat to identities, but as form of 
protection, as a way of keeping them alive, as a multiplier of power and influence, 
as much at the level of thought and culture as at the material level and the political 
level.
66
  
 
Europeanization has immense implications for national identity throughout the European 
Union.  The extent to which it is carried out makes the difference between a peaceful 
coexistence and dramatic replacement of the traditional structures and systems of identity 
formation.  According to Sarkozy, “the peoples of Europe are undergoing a deep identity 
crisis” as a result of Europeanization and the possibilities of social integration.
67
  
Legislation and political elites can espouse or denounce the merits of social integration, 
but the true force behind its progression is the general population, immense in number 
                                                
65
 Nicolas Sarkozy, “Speech after the passing of the bill authorizing the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty,” 
Paris, February 2008, http://ambafrance-in.org/france_inde/spip.php?article4282. 
66
 European Parliament, “Sarkozy to MEPs in Strasbourg: ‘Europe must be alive, a grand ideal, and a grand 
promise,’” November 2007, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&type=IM-
PRESS&reference=20071109IPR12787.  
67
 Ibid. 
 137 
and vocal in their opinion. 
 The results of public opinion polls taken from 2007 through the present provide 
an interesting complement to the study of the discourse of political elites.  Through these 
opinion polls, it is possible to analyze how the general population understands social 
integration and Europeanization and whether this understanding meshes with the elite 
discourse that is being espoused.  In a Eurobarometer poll taken in 2007, 57% of the 
French polled responded that they were either very attached or fairly attached to the EU, 
as compared to an EU average of 49%, suggesting that the social integration over the past 
fifteen years had had a positive effect on the relationship between the French citizen and 
the European Union.
68
  This trend is further exemplified by a poll taken in 2009 in which 
60% of French responded that when it comes to their identity, they believe that they are 
at the same time French and European.  Only 8% of the respondents said they did not feel 
French at all, suggesting that the creation of a European identity has not had the extreme 
negative impact that was once feared.
69
  Europeanization, in fact, has helped to protect 
French identity to an extent.  While in 2008 53% of French believed that globalization 
was a threat to French culture, 40% of French believed that the EU helped protect them 
from the negative aspects of globalization.
70
  As Sarkozy suggested in his speech, it is 
possible for Europeanization to be viewed as having a positive impact on the preservation 
of national identity, rather than threatening its existence.   
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 Perhaps the French are able to view Europeanization in a positive light because 
after a decade of discussion of social integration they are able to understand, at least to an 
extent, what Europeanization is and what it means for them.  Interestingly, when asked 
what the EU means to them, out of a list of choices from which they could pick more 
than one, 45% of French said the EU means the rights of man, 41% said peace and 34% 
said democracy.
 71
  These conceptions are all highly compatible with elements of French 
identity, making it easier for the French to reconcile Europeanization with their own 
traditions.  Furthermore, in 2009, the French had also developed an understanding of 
what European identity is.  When asked which items, chosen from a list, make up 
European identity, 57% said democracy and the respect of human rights, 56% said 
geography, 55% responded common market, 38% responded common history and 34% 
common culture.
72
  A concrete attachment of certain familiar ideas to the nebulous notion 
of European identity enables the French to see European identity as a correlation of their 
own national identity, rather than a competitor.  
 An analysis of the reaction to the Treaty of Lisbon, both by political elites and the 
general population in France suggests that increasingly, the social aspects of 
Europeanization are not perceived as a threat to national identity or social sovereignty.  
However, this perception is due in large part to the way in which Europeanization has 
progressed since the Maastricht Treaty.  Europeanization in the social realm has been 
much more gradual than in the economic or political realm.  However, in order for social 
integration to continue, this approach is absolutely necessary.  Because social sovereignty 
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is much more personal to the citizens of member states than their political or economic 
systems, they are much more skeptical of the impact of Europeanization.  Despite this 
wariness, social integration due to Europeanization is possible, so long as 
Europeanization is portrayed as a protector of, rather than a threat to, national identity 
and social sovereignty.  So long as national and European identity are understood to be 
complementary, rather than in conflict, Europeanization of the social sphere will be 
possible.  The progress may be slow, but in the long run, progress is progress, no matter 
what the speed. 
 
Conclusion 
 A study of the period of time between the passage of the Maastricht Treaty in 
1992 and the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2010 enables important 
conclusions to be drawn about the impact that Europeanization is having on social 
sovereignty in France and throughout the European Union.  Though at first glance French 
national identity, the epitome of social sovereignty, appears incompatible with the social 
integration proposed by Europeanization, in actuality, it seems possible to reconcile the 
two.  In fact, over the past twenty years, through several treaties (both successes and 
failures), the French elites and general population have increasingly been able to see 
Europeanization as a way to protect their national identity.   
 Though the French are jealous of their national identity and worried about the 
impact that Europeanization will have, they are even more fearful of the forces of 
globalization.  Europeanization and the EU add an additional barrier between France and 
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the globalizing, providing a degree of security and reassurance against the threats of 
world.  The French worry that the notions that they hold dear: democracy, culture, 
language and the state, the elements of nationalism, will be compromised in the new 
international system.  In a way, Europeanization is the lesser of two evils from which 
France can choose.  As the social aspects of the European Union are explicitly defined, 
the French are able to see connections between the values of the EU and those that they 
treasure in their own national identity.  Though the future with Europeanization may be 
uncertain, at least the French know that with the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of 
Lisbon there is legislation that will protect democracy, human rights, equality and 
freedom.   
 This is not to say, however, that the French are unequivocally willing to accept 
the social aspects of Europeanization.  Just as in the political realm, there is a unique 
dichotomy between an acceptance and fear of Europeanization.  This contradiction, 
though bizarre, is French in the deepest sense of the word.  Throughout the years, French 
identity has been characterized by an exceptionalism of inconsistencies and 
contradictions, incomprehensible to those who are not French.  The French are open to 
many ideas, so long as they accord with the French vision of what is acceptable in that 
realm.  In the social realm, then, the French can accept the aspects of Europeanization 
that are compatible with French identity.  It is when the two are opposed that conflicts 
arise.   
 The way in which Europeanization has progressed over the past two decades, 
however, has been orchestrated (to an extent) so that these conflicts do not exist.  The 
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careful balance that must be maintained between the nation-state and the EU has caused 
Europeanization in the social sphere to progress slowly.  However, as public opinion data 
shows, this strategy has been effective, especially among the younger generation.  While 
the older generations remain somewhat Euroskeptic, those poised to take power in France 
are increasingly willing to see Europeanization as an opportunity for, rather than a 
challenge to, French national identity.   
 While it is unlikely that the French will ever be the most vocal supporters of 
Europeanization in any realm, especially socially, what this chapter illustrates is that the 
French also will not necessarily be Europeanization’s greatest opponents.  If European 
leaders continue to be cautious and respectful of national sovereignty and national 
political leaders and the general population remain open to the possibilities of 
Europeanization, then social integration can progress.  Social integration will not be 
quick or easy, but no process that involves bringing together 500 million citizens across 
27 countries would be.  But just because it is not easy, does not mean it is not possible.  If 
anything can be learned from the experience that France has had with the social aspects 
of Europeanization over the past twenty years, it is precisely that it is never wise to say 
never.  If the exceptional French national identity and social sovereignty can be 
compatible with Europeanization and European identity, then the future of social 
integration amongst the 27 member states is promising, even if it takes time. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
 This study aimed at answering several questions pertaining to the relationship 
between Europeanization and the nation-states that make up the European Union.  First, 
and most broadly, what is the domestic impact of Europeanization?  Second, and a bit 
more focused, how does Europeanization impact national sovereignty?  Third, and most 
specifically, is the impact of Europeanization consistent across the different spheres of 
national sovereignty: economic, political, and social?  Answering these questions in 
terms of all the different countries in the European Union would have been a substantial 
task, and one that could not have been adequately completed given the limited amount of 
time devoted to this project.  As such, in order to answer these important questions about 
the relationship between Europeanization and national sovereignty, a single country was 
chosen for an in-depth case study: France.   
Because of France’s unique national identity, known as French exceptionalism, as 
well as the sustained internal debate between pro-Europeans and Euroskeptics, France is 
an ideal case study.  If Europeanization can impact one of the most reluctant member 
states, it is likely to have an effect throughout the rest of the European Union as well.  
Through the single case study, conclusions about the larger process of Europeanization 
throughout the remaining 26 EU member states can be drawn.  This chapter will be 
devoted to elaborating those conclusions.  First, it will provide a brief synopsis of 
France’s experience with Europeanization.  Then, there will be an examination and 
explanation of the process of Europeanization, based on the conclusions of chapters 4 and 
5.  Lastly, answers to the overarching questions driving this study will be presented to 
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understand what the implications of France’s case study are for the European Union as a 
whole. 
 
Europeanization and France 
 This project approached the analysis of the impact of Europeanization on French 
national sovereignty from two different directions, studying political sovereignty and 
social sovereignty.  Integration in both the political and social spheres has only become 
relevant in the recent history of the European Union, developing as a result of the 
economic integration that has existed since the inception of the European Union.  As 
such, these two cases provide important insights into how Europeanization progresses 
over time through various stages. 
 Political integration in the European Union was first extensively addressed by the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992, though it did exist to a degree previously.   The Maastricht 
Treaty enacted a broad range of changes aimed at strengthening the institutions within the 
EU to reassert its role in international politics.  Although the French were extremely 
divided over the Maastricht Treaty, with the ratification referendum passing by a narrow 
margin, ultimately the French did support Maastricht because they saw that the goals of 
the EU aligned with their vision of the shape that the European Union should take.  As a 
result of Maastricht, the EU was incorporated into the French Constitution and new 
political positions were created to address European affairs, indicating that the EU was 
recognized as increasingly important.  Maastricht laid important foundations, both in the 
EU and the nation-states that would enable the process of Europeanization to continue in 
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the future. 
 Europeanization progressed relatively smoothly throughout the 1990s, with the 
Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice both being ratified, enabling further integration of the 
member states.  However, the success of political integration was met with a roadblock in 
the new millennium: the EU Constitution.  The EU Constitution was aimed at providing 
for even closer integration among the member states while also increasing the authority 
of the EU and its political powers.  In France, as well as the Netherlands, the EU 
Constitution was met with staunch opposition, as the debates surrounding the Maastricht 
Treaty resurfaced.  The French did not believe that the EU that would result from the EU 
Constitution aligned with their vision of it and consequently, they did not ratify the 
Constitution. 
 However, the failure of the EU Constitution did not put an end to the progress of 
Europeanization.  Rather, it led to the creation of the Treaty of Lisbon, which 
reincorporated many of the elements of the EU Constitution to continue the process of 
political integration.  While it is still very early to analyze the impact of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, it is clear that the move towards political integration is continuing through the 
increased responsibilities afforded to the EU by the member states.  However, throughout 
this entire period of political integration, from the 1990s through the present, the 
strengthening of the EU has been balanced with the continued relevance and importance 
of the nation-state.  The French have not been opposed to Europeanization and its impact 
in the political realm, but they have not been the most vocal supporters of it either.  
Regardless, with each successive treaty that is ratified, the French become slightly more 
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willing to alter their perception of the EU, thus allowing Europeanization to progress 
while still upholding their view of what the EU should be. 
 It is very interesting to compare the French experience with Europeanization in 
the political and social realms.  Social integration has always lagged somewhat behind 
economic and political integration, but as the political and economic ties within the 
member states are strengthened, Europeanization has progressed into the social realm as 
well.  The Maastricht Treaty was really the first introduction of the notion of social 
integration and as such, it did not extensively address this realm.  The Maastricht Treaty 
encouraged the creation of a social dimension to the EU, but did not explain how this 
would be done.  However, coupled with the increased awareness of the EU politically, 
the Maastricht Treaty got the French and other European citizens thinking about the 
possibility of social integration and what it would mean for them.  Most importantly, the 
treaty created the notion of European citizenship, which laid a foundation for the 
extension of the social dimension of the EU in future legislation.   
 Social integration progressed somewhat slower than political integration 
throughout the post-Maastricht period.  However, with the EU Constitution, European 
leaders tried to take a big step toward social integration.  This creation of a constitution, 
rather than a treaty, had immense social implications, though supporters claimed that it 
was no more significant than a treaty.  However, as a Constitution, the document 
highlighted the authority of the EU, as opposed to the nation-state, which brought out the 
Euroskepticism in the French.  The French were willing to support social integration, so 
long as they did not believe that they had to forsake their national social sovereignty 
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entirely.  Consequently, they did not ratify the EU Constitution, leading to the creation of 
the more moderate Treaty of Lisbon that balanced the progress of the EU with the 
reluctance of the French.  The Treaty of Lisbon did not overstep the bounds of acceptable 
integration as the EU Constitution had but rather, provided an extra level of protection for 
the rights that the French people held dear.  By expanding on the rights that the French 
already considered to be important, social integration would be justified within the 
confines of French national identity.  Integration in the social realm, though perhaps the 
trickiest to achieve especially in France, also has the most potential.  As the French have 
slowly begun to realize, the social aspects of Europeanization can complement social 
sovereignty, rather than threaten it.  Furthermore, social integration is integration on the 
most basic level, upon which other forms of integration such as political and economic 
can be built, enabling the creation of an even stronger foundation for the European 
Union. 
 
Understanding Europeanization 
 If there is one conclusion to be drawn from the study of the impact of 
Europeanization on France it is this: Europeanization is an incredibly complex and 
powerful process.  Europeanization can be better understood by examining it through two 
different lenses, as an example of the spillover effect and as a top-down process.  
Understanding the mechanics behind the process of Europeanization enables a more 
complete analysis of how it impacts domestic regimes and the different spheres of 
national sovereignty. 
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 The process of Europeanization epitomizes the spillover effect; it becomes an 
increasingly more powerful force as it moves between the different realms of national 
sovereignty.  European integration first began in the economic realm.  Though this study 
did not touch extensively on economic integration, it is extremely important not to 
discount its impact on the shape that the EU has taken today.  The current structure of the 
EU developed out of the economic integration of the six members of the European Coal 
and Steel Community. Over time, the European Coal and Steel Community evolved into 
the European Economic Community, the European Community and finally into the 
European Union.  The founders of the ECSC discovered an area where the original 
member states had shared interests and were able to use that as a foundation for the 
immense political and social project that exists today.   
 As the states became more closely economically integrated, it was necessary for 
the EU to expand into the political realm.  The political extension of the EU enabled the 
regulation of the economic cooperation of the member states.  Whereas economic 
integration really just brought the member states together, political integration brought 
the leaders of those states together through the various EU institutions.  As such, political 
integration was more tangible than the abstract elements of economic integration that 
may not have touched the lives of political leaders or the citizens of the member states.  
With the expansion of political integration to complement economic integration, the EU 
has finally expanded into the social realm.   
The political and economic responsibilities given to the EU by the member states 
have become so important that the EU citizens can no longer avoid the EU.  In fact, most, 
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if not all, EU citizens interact with the EU on a daily basis as they pay in Euros.  
European citizens now participate in EU elections and carry EU passports, rather than a 
unique member state passport.  The social integration has finally brought European 
integration from cooperation between the states to cooperation within the states, as seen 
through the eyes of their citizens.  The EU is no longer just a distant economic and 
political regulator, but is now beginning to play a distinct role in the lives of many 
citizens throughout the member states. 
The progression of Europeanization throughout the different realms of 
sovereignty also reflects the way in which Europeanization is a top down process.  Unlike 
other social, political or economic movements, Europeanization is essentially imposed 
upon states and their citizens from the top down, rather than being generated from the 
bottom.  This process can be seen in the way that the EU developed, beginning 
economically, progressing politically and succeeding socially in the present era.  
Economic integration occurred on a supranational level, political integration brought 
together political leaders throughout the nations and social integration unified the citizens 
of the member states.   
As Europeanization touches each of the different levels (supranational, national 
and subnational), the actors on that level reinforce the process of Europeanization.  One 
of the critical factors to progression of Europeanization is its success as a feedback 
mechanism.  With each new extension of European integration, the previous areas of 
integration are strengthened and further supported.  When Europeanization touches each 
level, it creates a new set of actors who have responsibilities to the EU in addition to their 
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member states.  As states, leaders, and citizens are impacted by the process of 
Europeanization they are given the freedom to impact the EU.  Once bonds are formed 
across states, and interdependence begins, it becomes incredibly difficult for the states, 
leaders, and citizens to remove themselves from their new integrated relationships.  This 
is what enables Europeanization to progress.   
Because of the way in which Europeanization has progressed, now becoming 
especially relevant in the social realm and the lives of the citizens, these subnational 
actors will drive the future of the EU.  No longer will the decisions of the political elites 
suffice in contributing to the future integration of the member states.  Rather, the impetus 
for further integration will come from the citizens as well.  Likewise, because the process 
of integration has begun in all three realms, future EU legislation must continue to push 
for integration across all three realms.  Now that the supranational, national, and 
subnational actors are linked economically, politically, and socially, integration must 
continue or else risk the disintegration of the EU entirely. 
 
Europeanization Questions, Answered 
 Based on the synopses of the process of Europeanization and France’s experience 
with that process, it is now possible to answer the overarching questions that motivated 
this study.  The answers to the broader questions build on the answers to the more 
specific questions. Understanding the impact of Europeanization on the different types of 
national sovereignty enables an understanding of the overall impact on national 
sovereignty, ultimately resulting in drawing conclusions about implications for the future 
 151 
of Europeanization and the nation-state.  
 There is no doubt that Europeanization has had an impact on the different spheres 
of sovereignty that were addressed in this study.  The impact of Europeanization has been 
most significant in the economic realm, which was only touched upon briefly.  This is 
due in large part to the fact that the process of Europeanization was born out of the 
economic realm.  Though the impact of Europeanization in the political and social realms 
is more limited, it is no less important. 
 From the Maastricht Treaty through the Treaty of Lisbon, the progression of 
Europeanization in the political realm has been evident.  Over time, the EU has become a 
much more effective political actor, taking more responsibility for various spheres.  As 
would be expected, political integration is strongest in areas where it is related to 
economic regulation.  In France, political integration has been met with wholehearted 
support when the direction of Europeanization accords with the vision that the French 
hold of the EU.  However, when the visions do not align, the French stand in opposition 
to political integration.  This is due in large part to continuing uncertainty about just how 
effective the EU will be as a political actor.  The French leaders want to hold on to some 
of their sovereignty as somewhat of a safety net in case political integration fails.  
However, if Europeanization continues to positively affect the EU’s capabilities as an 
international actor, it is likely that political integration will continue to be supported.  The 
political sovereignty of the nation-state may never be replaced, but a sharing of 
sovereignty between the state and the EU is feasible and possible.  
 The evolution of social sovereignty has not occurred to the same extent as has that 
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of political or economic sovereignty.  However, the skeptical optimism with which the 
French approach social integration does allow for the possibility of the progression of 
Europeanization.  The French are not willing to hand over sovereignty to the EU, but they 
are willing to explore the possibility of sharing it with the EU.  As with political 
integration, they are in favor of integration when it accords with the notions that they 
already hold of their sovereignty.  In a way, the EU can provide an extra level of 
protection against the threat that globalization poses to national identity.  The creation of 
an EU value system helps to reassure the French, and others, that there are shared goals 
that can be pursued more effectively in unison.  Unlike in the sphere of political 
sovereignty, where power and authority are divided by issue, in the social sphere, the EU 
can be seen as a support for the continued authority of the nation-state. 
 Thus, Europeanization does not have the same impact on all the different spheres.  
Economically, the EU has largely replaced the nation-state that now supports the policies 
of the EU.  Politically, power is effectively split between the nation-state and the EU, 
with each one retaining sovereignty in certain areas.  Socially, the nation-state retains 
sovereignty, with the EU acting as a secondary support in areas that the nation-states 
considering to be particularly important. 
 Consequently, Europeanization has not necessarily eroded sovereignty but rather, 
has caused France and other states to the change the way in which they conceptualize 
sovereignty.  While the states may be losing control in certain areas, their dominance is 
reaffirmed in other areas.  Giving certain facets of power to the EU means that the states 
gain power in other areas as well.  As a result of EU legislation, states are now 
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responsible for upholding the Charter of Fundamental Rights, national parliaments are 
required to approve all legislation that is passed down from the EU, and citizens have a 
formal right to petition the EU.  Sovereignty is also being transferred between the 
different levels of governance: supranational, national and subnational.  Actors on the 
national level are given responsibility for regulating European Affairs.  With social 
integration, citizens are given more power and responsibility in the EU. 
 Sovereignty is traditionally viewed as an either/or system: either the EU has 
control or the state has control.  What this study has illustrated, however, is that 
sovereignty can be shared, not only between the EU and the nation-state, but between 
leaders and citizens within those nation-states as well.  Both states and citizens are being 
empowered in new areas in compensation for areas where they may be losing a degree of 
control.  Europeanization is changing national sovereignty, but it is not destroying it.  The 
process of Europeanization has allowed for a reinterpretation of what national 
sovereignty means and what the responsibilities of the nation, the state, the nation-state 
and the European Union are to the world and to one another. 
 The process of Europeanization has begun, for better or for worse.  Now that it 
has spread through the different spheres traditionally associated with national 
sovereignty, it has gather momentum and consequently, will continue to march forward.  
It is likely that economic integration will always be the strongest, with political 
integration following, and social sovereignty lagging behind somewhat.  Though 
Europeanization may be initiated on the European level, it is a dual process, taking place 
on the national level as well.  For it to be successful, there must be a bargain of sorts 
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struck between European leaders and domestic leaders and the citizens of all the member 
states.  
 So long as Europeanization occurs as a process and is allowed to develop the 
competencies of the EU slowly, there is no doubt that the EU will continue to be 
successful.  But Europeanization cannot be rushed or forced.  As a self-reinforcing 
process, over time, Europeanization will lead to the closer integration of the member 
states: from the top down and the bottom up, between states, within states, and across the 
political, social and economic realms.  The European Union is crossing into uncharted 
international territory, but with the cooperative guidance of the supranational 
organization and the member states, it can navigate the waters and successfully reach the 
land of closer integration. 
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